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SPECIALIZATION TREND: WATER COURTS
BY
VANESSA CASADO PEREZ *
Def ning property rights is not useful unless there is an
enforcement system, either publc or private, that backs it up. While the
defnution of property rights as a solution to the tragedy of the
commons has been carefully analyzed in the literature, the enforcement
piece has been somewhat overlooked With climate change, water is
becoming scarcer and conflict is rising. As a result, the need for an
efficient and fair enforcement system is more necessary than ever.
Given the complexity of water law and the backlog in the judicial
system, introducing specialization in the resolution of water cases
should be encouraged Enforcement may take different forms: from
administrative agency decisions to judicial decisions. This Article
focuses on the judiciary, where speciaization in the environmental
arena has gained traction in recent decades in the United States and
abroad Specialization ensures faster esolution and better-qualhty
decisions. To achieve those beneflits, jurisdictions do not need to create
a whole new system of courts necessarily. For example, in water,
specialization in the judiciary can range from special masters assisting
generalist judges in water cases or general judges who get assigned all
water cases on the docket to full-fledged specialized courts. Some
jurisdictions have already introduced some of these measures. Other
jurisdictions feel an acute need for them. This Atdcle offers water-
scarce jurisdictions a portfolo of specialization strategies for their
judiciaries to solve water disputes and, perhaps, other climate change
induced disputes.
First, the Artiele covers how the literature has analyzed
specialized tribunals across different legal areas, along with their
advantages and disadvantages. Second, it establishes the need for
specialized water courts and their procedural particulaities. Factual
and legal complexity of water disputes demands pecialization both at
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M School of Law. Associate Research Professor, Texas
A&M Department of Agricultural Economics. JSD (NYU), LLM (University of Chicago). I thank
the participants at the RMMLF Natural Resources Teachers workshop, PERC Lone Mountain
fellows' workshop, Nuno Garoupa, David Schorr, and John Thorton. This project has benefited
from informal conversation with water judges and other officials. I thank Jordan Simmons
Hayes and Morgan Parker for their research assistance. Finally, I am incredibly grateful for the
diligent work of the editors of Volume 49 of EnvironmentalLaw. Errors are mine alone.
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the trial and at the appellate level Third, the Article analyzes existing
examples of water courts. The cases analyzed include Colorado,
Southeastern Spain, South Africa, and Montana water courts In
addition, it includes examples of other forms of specialization. The
Article concludes by highighting the lessons and guidelines that can be
learned from those specialized strategies and advocates for incremental
measures towards specialization, both in institutional design and in
procedural rules.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Definition of property rights is an essential solution to the tragedy of
the commons' from which many of our natural resources suffer. The
scholarship analyzing how property rights are created and how they evolve
often takes for granted the enforcement of those rights. Enforcement is key.
Enforcement is a public good often, but not exclusively, provided by
See generally Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Propety RWht&, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347 (1967).
2 See, e.g, id at 347 (discussing "the elements of an economic theory of property rights"
but not addressing enforcement).
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government. Enforcement takes many different forms: from ostracism in
self-governed property rights systems to administrative agencies' resolutions
and judicial decisions in formal property right systems.
This Article focuses on the last step in the enforcement of water rights:
the courts. In particular, it analyzes whether the introduction of water courts
is advisable in western United States. Currently, water rights are first
enforced by administrative agencies, and the decisions of those agencies
may be challenged in court. For example, a water rights holder may
challenge a water agency's denial of a location change for their water right.
3
Additionally, private parties may bring claims against other water rights
holders to court. Presently water cases are heard by generalist state courts.
However, water law cases may unduly burden the dockets of those
generalist courts.4 Courts decide on many different areas and the complexity
of the facts and the law in water law cases suggests that a different
institutional design, one with specialized courts, may be more efficient.5 The
gains in efficiency will come from a faster, more accurate resolution of
cases.
Specialized courts are quite common from a comparative perspective in
areas as varied as corporate matters, tax issues, gender violence,
administrative law, family law, or patents.7 One such area is environmental
law. Forty-two countries have specialized environmental courts. For
example, India created the Green Tribunal in 2010,8 New South Wales
(Australia) has the Land and Environmental Courts that hear environmental
and land use cases since 1979.9 Sweden, in 2011, replaced property and
environmental courts for a system of Land and Environment Courts which
also hears water cases.'o
In the United States, the generalist judge is celebrated." Judge Posner
wrote in defense of the generalist judge in 1983.'2 While in 1990, the United
States Judicial Conference qualified them as "exotic,' 3 around that time the
3 See, e.g., Eardley v. Terry, 77 P.2d 362, 363 (Utah 1938); Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co.,
133 P.3d 382, 384-386 (Utah 2006); Eaton v. State Water Rights Bd., P.2d 722, 724 (Cal. Dist Ct.
App. 1959).
4 See infra section II.A.
5 Id
6 Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving
Business Disputes; 61 BROOK L. REv. 1, 12 (1995).
7 Markus B. Zimmer, Overview of Specialized Courts, INT'L J. CT. ADMIN., Aug. 2009, at 1.
8 Eeshan Chaturvedi, Green Courts: The WayForward, CORNELL POL'Y REV. (Feb. 6,2017),
https://perma.cc/YYG5-D4N6; see also Domenico Amirante, Environmental Courts in
Comparative Perspective: Prelilnary Reflections on the National Green Tribunal of India 29
PACE ENvrL. L. REV. 441,441 (2012).
9 AMANDA KENNEDY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND LAND USE CONFLICT 54 (2017).
10 Land and Envronmental Courts, SVERIGES DOMSTOLAR, https-//permaccH2E9-JTRH (last
visited Apr. 13, 2019).
11 Edward K Cheng, The Myth of the GeneralistJudge, 61 STAN. L. REv. 519, 520 (2008).
12 Judge Posner defends functional specialization, but not subject-matter specialization.
Richard A. Posner, Wil the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on
Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 CAL. L. REv. 761, 762-63 (1983).
13 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE 12 (1990).
However, even earlier in 1973, there was a report studying the feasibility of establishing
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Vermont Superior Court Environmental Division 4 and the Shelby County-
Tennessee Environmental Court were created. Setting aside the
specialization of administrative law judges such as the United States
Environmental Protection Agency administrative law judges or the
environmental appeals board," there are plenty of examples of specialized
courts in the United States, such as bankruptcy courts or Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals.1
7
Water law has not been immune to specialization at the judicial level.
Water law is similar to environmental law"' and patent law because both the
facts and the regulations are very complex. In fact, across the world, water
issues have often prompted the establishment of environmental courts and
tribunals."9 In the United States, only Colorado has a system of water
courts. These courts have been in place since 19692' but, surprisingly, the
literature about specialized courts has not paid much attention to these
Colorado courts. In addition, some specialized courts, created to deal with
the adjudication processes in the western states where water rights were not
properly recorded, are becoming permanent courts of limited jurisdiction.2
While there are few examples, water courts are not frequent. However,
voices advocate for them. For example, in California, when drought strikes,
there are often claims of the need for water courts.2
This Article analyzes whether water law courts are a sound reform to
deal with water rights disputes in an era of climate change which will
inevitably make water disputes more common. Water courts compete with
general courts as a forum for dispute resolution, but hey also compete with
market mechanisms or with political deal-making as alternative ways to
environmental courts. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAND AND NAT. RES. DIv., REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ON THE FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN
ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYSTEM (1973).
14 Environmental Division, VT. JUDICIARY, https'//perm-cc/34TC-ALPB (last visited Apr. 13,
2019).
15 History of Environmental Cour4 SHELBY CrY., TENN., httpsJ/perma.cc/F46T-6TMM (last
visited Apr. 13, 2019).
16 About the Office of Offlce ofAdmniiutratdve Law Judges (OAL), U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY, https'J/permcc/L7VS-W9AZ (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
17 See generally Robert M. Howard, Comparing the Decision Making of Specialized Courts
and General Courts: An Exploration of Tax Decision, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 119, 136 (2005).
18 Environmental regulation has reached the same, or maybe even surpassed the
complexity of the Internal Revenue Code. Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts A Choice? 76 Nw.
U. L. REV. 745, 747, 750 (1981). If that was the case in 1981, it should be more so today.
19 GEORGE W. PRING & CATHERINE PRING, GREENING JUSTICE: CREATING AND IMPROVING
ENVIRONMENTAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 9(2009).
20 Water Courts, COLO. JUDICIAL BRANCH, https://permatcc/3GKE-DTEX (last visited Apr. 13,
2019).
21 Id
22 In Montana, "SB 028 - Allow Water Disputes to be Appealed to the Water Court was
passed in 2017." John Thorson, A Permanent Water Court Proposal for a Post-General Stream
Adjudication World, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 17, 18-19 (2016), https'J/perma.cc/JN2V-V2WV.
23 See, e.g., Gary Pitzer, Does California Need A Water Courtl WATER EDUC. FOUND.,
https://perma.cc/Q9U9-5TZ5 (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
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solve water conflicts.24 A better system of judicial decision making should
reduce the overall social costs of water conflicts.
In order to assess the suitability of water courts, the Article starts by
analyzing the comparative advantages and disadvantages of specialized
courts in relation to the current system of generalist courts. Second, it looks
at some examples of existing water courts in the United States and beyond,
namely the Water tribunal of Valencia, the South Africa Water Court,
Colorado Water Courts, and the Montana Water Court. Third, the Article
describes the trend towards specialization in water law judicial decision
making and distills the characteristics that a water court should have and
how those could also inform the establishment of other specialized judicial
institutions for other natural resources.
II. SPECIALIZED TRIBUNALS
Specialized courts are expected to make quicker decisions, reducing
the workload of regular courts, and provide higher quality decisions, thus
ensuring legal coherence and uniform judicial decisions.2 Beyond these
advantages that all scholars agree on, some works on specialized courts
identify additional advantages.26 The study Greening Justice about the
potential for environmental courts lists visibility as an advantage.27 The
report understands environmental courts as a way to increase the public
relevance of a subject because by creating these courts, the government
shows that environmental issues are a topic of great importance.u The
lessons offered here for specialized water courts can be translated to many
other areas.
If all the above advantages were realized, private parties should favor
specialized courts because they would greatly reduce the cost of doing
business in the subject matter areas where those courts specialize.2
Additionally, a trustworthy, respected judicial system is a key part of
procedural environmental justice.3° Some scholars consider specialized
24 Bonnie G. Colby & Tamra Pearson D'Estree, Economic Evaluation of Mechanisms to
Resolve Water Conflicts; 16 INT'L J. WATER RES. DEv. 239, 242-44 (2000).
25 PRING & PRING, supra note 19, at 14-16.
26 Id. The list of advantages includes expertise, efficiency, visibility, cost, uniformity,
standing, government accountability, prioritization, creativity, alternative dispute resolution,
issue integration, remedy integration, public participation, public confidence, problem solving,
and judicial activism. Judicial activism is a double-edged sword because it can also be perceived
as biased decision-making. Many of these listed advantages, cannot be claimed by specialized
courts and are not exclusive to specialized courts. Instead, many of those, such as issue and
remedy integration or recourse to alternative dispute resolution techniques depend heavily on
the particular design of the court and the procedural rules that it must apply. Id.
27 Id.
28 Id at xiii.
29 Id. at 14-15.
30 KENNEDY, supra note 9. In Sweden, the combination of technical experts and law-trained
judges on the bench has contributed to the public confidence on the land and environmental
2019]
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
courts as increasing public confidence3 in the system, which in turn may
enjoy greater legitimacy.3 Subpart A below will focus on the two advantages
that encompass all the additional ones listed in the current scholarship on
the topic: celerity and quality of adjudication
There are also costs to specialization beyond the costs of setting up a
new court infrastructure. Specialized courts present a higher risk of capture
because they may have fewer players-plaintiffs or defendants-and those
players are often repeat players who will always face a small number of
judges.34 In addition, while judges would be experts, they may become siloed
and ignore developments in other areas of the law which could be beneficial
if incorporated in the specialized area the judge is assigned to.3 Subpart B
analyzes these costs. Finally, Subpart C will review the different institutional
designs available to introduce specialization in the judiciary.
A Benefits
1. Celerity
Celerity is probably the greatest advantage from a private party
perspective.M Specialized courts are supposed to reach decisions faster
because the judges know the subject area, and thus they do not need to be
educated by parties and their experts as much as general judges.3 Judges
working on a particular subject area will not only know in detail the rules
applicable to the specialized area, they will also be more educated on the
technical aspects of the facts and regulations of that subject area-Y While a
specialized judge in, for example, environmental law, does not need to be a
biologist or a chemist, sitting on environmental cases would make him an
educated consumer of the technical and scientific issues. In addition, this is
compounded with the fact that, at least initially, specialized courts are not as
backlogged as general courts."' Nonetheless, evidence in favor of the celerity
of specialized courts is mixed.4
courts' decisions. See Ulf BjdlAs, Experiences of Sweden's Environmental Courts; 3 J. CT.
INNOVATION 177,183 (2010).
31 PRING & PRING, supra note 19, at 16.
32 Cheng, supra note 11, at 549.
33 Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administraive Lawmaking System, 138 U.
PA. L REv. 1111, 1115 (1990); see also PRING & PRING, supra note 19, at 14; Nuno Garoupa et al.,
Assessing the Argument for Specialized Courts Evidence from Family Courts in Spain, 24 INT. J.
L. POL'Y. & FAM. 54, 55 (2010).
34 PRING & PRING, supra note 19, at 17-18.
35 Id
36 Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 14.
37 PRING & PRING, supra note 19, at 14-15.
38 Id. at 14.
39 Id at 15,17.
40 Garoupa et al., supra note 33, at 63-64. However, in some cases, decisions are reached
faster. See Carolina Arlota & Nuno Garoupa, Do Specialized Courts Make a Difference?
Evidence from Brazilian Sate Supreme Courts, 27 EuR. Bus. L. REV. 487, 495, 499 (2016); see
592 [Vol. 49:587
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The results regarding speed may depend on the institutional design in
addition to the expertise of the judges and how the legal community with
cases before the new courts reacts to their establishment and activity.
4'
Celerity in reaching decisions translates into lower litigation costs, which
improves access to justice.42 However, the positive effect on the length of
time needed to obtain a judicial decision may be counterbalanced by an
increase in the workload of those specialized courts. If adjudication before
those specialized courts becomes attractive to litigants as a result of the
increase in efficiency, parties may give up extra-judicial means of solving
conflicts in favor of judicial adjudication.4 Thus, as an efficient specialized
court decreases the amount of time that it takes to decide a case, its docket
may increase in the number of cases." This could make the court less
attractive than alternative systems of resolving conflicts. In fact, some
specialized courts in the environmental arena promote the use of alternative
dispute resolution methods to avoid backlog.4 Finally, as it shall be seen
next, if specialized courts provide better decisions, the predictability of the
law in the subject area may increase and reduce overall conflicts.7
2. Quality of Adjudcation
Specialization should translate into better opinions thanks to the
knowledge and expertise of the bench. Defining better opinions is a difficult
task because the quality of a legal field and its trajectory is a moving target
and it should be defined against some measure that captures the social
impact. As Cheng put it, "even if expert judges cannot necessarily ensure
i'ght answers, their decisions are more likely to fall within the subset of
better answers owing to their greater experience and understanding of a
field."'9 Specialized judges are likely to commit fewer accidental mistakes.6°
Dreyfuss suggests that expert judges will be able to choose between
when it is acceptable to state a slightly inaccurate bright line rule that
ensures administrative convenience and when it is not advisable to sacrifice
accuracy."' Other authors have measured quality of the legal doctrines
announced by specialized courts by looking at citations by other courts,
also MARGARET S. WILLIAMS ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT PILOT PROGRAM: FIVE-YEAR
REPORT 38-39 (2016), https://permaccKZW7-YSDZ.
41 Id at 39.
42 PRING & PRING, supra note 19, at 15.
43 Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 34.
44 Id.
45 Brian J. Preston, Benefits of Judicial Specialization i  Environmental Law: The Land and
Environment Court of New South Wales as a Case Study, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 396, 413 (2012);
see also infra note 103 and accompanying text.
46 Amirante, supra note 8, at 452.
47 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, SpecializedAdudication, 1990 BYU L. REV. 377, 382 (1990).
48 Preston, supra note 45, at 423.
49 Cheng, supra note 11, at 524.
50 David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Revlew of FederalAdministrative Action:
Questfor the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L REV. 1, 67 (1975).
51 Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 378.
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length, and rate of dissent. The evidence only shows that dissents are more
common in specialized tribunals.2 The explanation given is that judges in the
Brazilian state courts examined in the study are career judiciary judges and,
as such, they see opinions as a way to enhance their reputation amongst the
expert bench.5 However, dissents may not really affect private parties unless
those dissents open the door to more litigation if the decision by a
specialized tribunal is reviewed by superior courts.
Additionally, other studies use rate of appeal and reversal by superior
courts as a proxy for the quality of the decision making. Using the rate of
appeal implies that litigants will be more likely to accept the decision of an
expert court.55 Behind the use of the reversal rate is the belief that generalist
lower courts will be reversed more often than expert courts because expert
courts have mastered the legal doctrines and, thus, would choose the
optimal answer.6 Those two effects are not necessarily independent. After
some time where superior courts have affirmed the majority of lower expert
court decisions, litigants may appeal fewer cases because they anticipate
that their chances of success would be slim. The Patent Pilot Project, which
offered a natural experiment where some districts had expert judges and
some others did not, found that "while pilot cases are a substantial
percentage of all patent cases (76%), they are a smaller percentage of
appeals (57/o)". 7 However, the same study concludes that the rate of reversal
is no different for expert and non-expert judges.M A qualitative data point
that suggests specialized courts are successful is the expansion of their
jurisdiction in Sweden. Swedish environmental courts were renamed as
Land and Environmental Courts when their jurisdiction expanded to
incorporate control over land use planning decisions.M
B. Costs
The two main costs that arise from a system of specialized judicial
bodies are costs associated with their establishment and the potential for
bias in their decisions.6° Other costs may arise depending on the institutional
52 Arlota & Garoupa, supra note 40, at 499.
53 Id
54 WnInAMs ET AL., supra note 40, at 31.
55 Id at 32.
56 Id at 36.
57 Id at 32.
58 Id. at 36.
59 Bjallhs, supra note 30, at 180.
60 Richard Posner unpacks the different sides on what bias captures. He lists the following
disadvantages of specialized courts compared to the federal appellate generalist courts: 1) the
politicization of the specialized court because its work can be more controlled by the other
branches, in part, because it is more predictable how someone appointed judges will lean on
cases of the same subject; 2) the identification with the governmental program that they are
trying to enforce; 3) the monopolistic nature of a smaller, subject-matter specialized court; 4)
lack of geographical diversity; 5) reduction of cross-pollination; 6) boundary problems between
areas of law; and 7) difficulty in managing a variable caseload. Some of these, such as four or
six, depend on how the court is structured. Posner, supra note 12, at 783-89.
[Vol. 49:587594
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design adopted. Relatedly, some have also argued specialized courts may
suffer a loss of prestige."
1. Establshment and Operational Costs
First, establishing and running a new system of courts is costly. Costs
will include new judges, new clerks, new administrative staff, and new
headquarters as needed, etc. Local taxpayers will likely shoulder the costs
even though the general public is not likely to use the specialized court
system and there is a different group who will directly benefit from the new
court. To the extent possible, part of the operating costs should be covered
by the fees paid by those who received the benefits of the specialized courts.
This being said, the public would indirectly benefit in two ways. First, if the
establishment of this new court system reduces the workload of general
courts, then it would allow general courts to decide their cases faster.
Second, the higher quality of the judicial decisions should increase the
overall societal benefit.
As stated in Part I, there are different ways to design a specialized
system. It could be just a spin-off of the regular court system, having some
judges assigned to be water judges, like the Patent Pilot Projecte or in
Colorado. Such a system will likely reduce the overhead costs of the
specialized courts. In general, the areas where specialized courts are
established are areas where litigation is expensive because the complexity
of the case translates into higher costs due to, for example, the need of
expert witnesses. Hence, a specialized court opens the door to reducing the
costs by offering cheaper access to justice thanks to tailored procedural
rules and a lessened need for multiple experts.6
2. Risk of Capture
These specialized courts can be captured by specialized interests
because there would be fewer repeat players before the court. The
institutional design could help mitigate this concern, via, for example, life
tenure to insulate judges from re-election or re-appointment pressure.
Similarly, the selection process can minimize this concern.' Furthermore,
this concern is not as acute in every single area. Some areas are more prone
to capture than others. For example, an area where an administrative agency
is likely to be a repeat player raises concerns because judges may tend to
favor the agency. It would be hard to disentangle judges' bias with the
advantage that accumulated experience before the court may give to the
agencies. Judge Posner believed that a specialized court populated by
specialists would identify too much with the government program's goals
61 PRING & PRING, supra note 19, at 18; see also Cheng, supra note 11, at 554.
62 WILUAMS ET AL., supra note 40, at 2.
63 PRING & PRING, supra note 19, at 15.
64 Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 426.
2019] 595
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they review because it would have been the focus of their careers."
However, it could also be the case that lawyers normally defending private
parties against the agency are the potential judges, and thus would be more
hostile to the government program. Judge Posner's point is broader, though:
a specialist in a specialized court cannot be tempered in his or her legal
interpretations.6
This concern of favoring a particular side may also exist if instead of an
agency there are some repeated, powerful players against opposing litigants
which are likely to be not as knowledgeable or sophisticated.7 If there is a
leveled playing field, the concerns about capture should be mitigated.
Capture may also arise from the existence of a specialized bar. However,
even generalist courts could be perceived as captured by, instead of a
specialized bar, a local bar. The bar may be specialized even before the
specialized court is established or it may become specialized as a response
to a new specialized court. Either way, scholars do not think the
specialization of the bar is problematic."
In the United States, some of the specialized courts created by
Congress have been considered captured and their decisions biased," but
there is no empirical evidence of this. Evidence from Brazilian and Spanish
courts suggest that their specialized tribunals have not been captured."0 The
case study of Spanish courts is particularly relevant because it focuses on
Administrative Law Judicial courts where one of the parties is always a
public agency.7' The study examines medical malpractice cases, comparing
the decisions of civil courts and administrative courts in similar cases; that
is, it compares the results in malpractice cases where the tortfeasor is a
private hospital and those where the injuring party is a public hospital. In
65 Posner, supra note 12, at 785. This viewpoint is also shared by Judge Plager. S. Jay
Plager, The United States Courts ofAppeals, the Federal Circui; and the Non-Regional Subject
Matter Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 853, 858 (1989-1990);
see also, Cheng, supra note 11, at 560. ("For example, Subpart I.D.1 suggests a possible
correlation between specializing in criminal law and being a former prosecutor. If judges
without a criminal law background avoid writing criminal opinions, and former criminal
defense attorneys seldom become judges because of political unpopularity, then in essence only
former prosecutors will direct the future of federal criminal law. Regardless of one's political
leanings, this lopsided situation is almost unquestionably undesirable.").
6 Posner, supra note 12, at 785.
67 See Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 380; Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization, Litigant
Influence, and Substantive Policy.- The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 11 L & Soc'Y REV.
823, 827-28 (1977). But see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REv.
67, 93 (1995) ("Despite the wide adherence to the percolation and cross-fertilization arguments,
there appears to be no dramatic evidence of specialized courts making erroneous decisions,
deciding issues too quickly or too firmly, or basing their decisions on too narrow a base of fact,
law or nonlegal information.").
68 Preston, supra note 45, at 426.
69 Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 392.
70 See Arlota & Garoupa, supra note 40, at 498-99; Sofia Amaral-Garcia & Nuno Garoupa,
Do Adhnis&ave Courts Favour the Government? Evidence from Medical Malpractice in
Spain, 6 J. EuR. TORT L. 241, 258 (2015).
71 See Amaral-Garcia & Garoupa, supra note 70, at 242.
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those cases, the courts seem to disfavor the government party.72 This result




The benefits hinge on the expertise of the bench and expertise on the
subject matter. In general, judges accumulate functional expertise as they sit
on the bench. Judge Bazelon said that "substantive review of mathematical
and scientific evidence by technically illiterate judges is dangerously
unreliable .... ", He advocated for focusing on procedural grounds and
letting the agencies come to their own conclusions regarding technical
issues if appropriate procedures were followed. 5 A specialized court may be
in a better position to decide substantively on those matters, thus needing to
defer less to the agencies. Even if the deference was maintained in order to
avoid a chilling effect on agency decision making, fewer expert-hours and
fewer judge-hours would be needed to decide these cases.
Expertise can be preexisting or gained in a specialized court system.
Preexisting experience implies that judges need to be selected from either
the pool of judges who have presided on many cases of the area of law that
the specialized court is going to tackle or from a pool of other legal
professionals who work in the specialized area. Judges with experience may
bring about the benefits of specialized courts faster, as they are experts in
both the subject matter and the task of adjudicating disputes. Alternatively,
legal professionals without particular expertise in the subject matter could
be chosen. If that is the case, those newly minted specialized judges will
accumulate expertise as they preside over cases in the particular subject
matter.6 If judges are not specialists in the subject matter,7 they will at least
be more familiar with the procedures and operation of a court and can learn
the specialized area quickly. Judge turnover will also impact how much
expertise accumulates in the court as an institution. Selection process has a
huge impact on how much expertise, and which type of expertise, matters.
Using non-experts on the subject matter helps avoid biases that a career in a
particular area may cause.TM
72 Arlota & Garoupa, supra note 40, at 498-99; Amaral-Garcia & Garoupa, supra note 70, at
256.
73 Amaral-Garcia & Garoupa, supra note 70, at 243.
74 Ethyl Corp. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 67 (1976).
75 Id.
76 Isaac Unah, Specialized Courts of Appeals' Renvew of Bureaucratic Actions and the
Politics of Protectionism, 50 POL. RES. Q. 851, 858 (1997).
77 Specialized courts have been staffed with specialist judges. Revesz, supra note 33, at
1111.
78 Posner, supra note 12, at 785.
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Bankruptcy judges offer a good illustration of expertise, as the
bankruptcy bench is one of the most expert benches in the United States.
Bankruptcy judges are appointed to the different districts by the active
Circuit Courts of Appeals' judges in the jurisdiction.m Their appointment
process varies across circuits but there are some commonalities. Most
circuits have a merit selection panel which screens applicants and proposes
the best candidates to the circuit's judicial council.'8 The latter will then
submit nominations to the circuit judges who will vote for and appoint the
district judges."' The formal requirements, such as being a member of the bar
in good standing, do not include a formal requirement to have expertise in
bankruptcy law." However, in some circuits, the merit panels include
bankruptcy judges or bankruptcy practitioners.' In addition, in a study
consisting of interviews, many members mentioned knowledge of
bankruptcy law and practice experience with debtors, creditors, and
consumer and business clients as relevant to the selection process."' But the
most frequently cited quality was judicial temperament, which, from the
explanation, can be understood as a mix between skills and demeanor and
the key to ensuring a trustworthy system.8 The trust in the system is very
important because "[n]inety-plus percent of citizens' exposure to federal
court is bankruptcy court."'8 One dimension that can also affect trust is
diversity on the bench, and it has been noted that bankruptcy courts have
been more homogeneous than other federal courts.
So far, I have talked about judges only being legal professionals, but
they could also be non-lawyers with a technical expertise in the subject
matter. This is the case in Sweden where the regional Land and Environment
Courts88 have one law-trained judge, one environmental technical advisor,
and two law expert members.8 These four members have equal weight in the
decisions.Y The Swedish Environment Court of Appeals, in contrast, has four
79 MALIA REDDICK & NATALIE KNOWLTON, INST. ADVANCEMENT AM. LEGAL Sys., A CREDIT TO
THE COURTS: THE SELECTION, APPOINTMENT, AND REAPPOINTMENT PROCESS FOR BANKRUPTCY
JUDGES 1, 2 (2013), https://permacc/5RM4-BXMC.
80 Id at 2-3.
81 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act, 98 Pub. L. No. 98-353, tit. I, § 120(1)
(1984).
82 Id
83 Malia Reddick & Natalie Knowlton, A CREDIT To THE COURTS: THE SELECTION,
APPOINTMENT, AND REAPPOINTMENT PROCESS FOR BANKRUPTCY JUDGES 10 (2013),
https://permaccNV5QQ-NA42.
84 Id at 15. In their study, from the twenty-five judges that they interviewed, all but two had
been bankruptcy attorneys and on average had nineteen years of experience. Id The Seventh
Circuit has a tradition of not picking bankruptcy lawyers. Id.
85 Id
86 Id at 14.
87 See id at 22. Eighty-nine percent of the bankruptcy court's judges are Caucasian, while
only 22% of Article III judges are. Id In terms of gender diversity, bankruptcy courts do not fare
much better, 27% are women, while on the Article mI bench 30% are women. Id.
88 PRING & PRING, supra note 19, at 31.




law-trained judges.9' This choice reflects the fact that at the trial level,
technical experts are key to disentangle complex facts, but that at the
appellate level, harmonizing complex legal doctrines is paramount.
Nonetheless, on appeal, one of the judges can be substituted by a technical
expert in the substantive area of the case.9' Similarly, in India, the
composition of the National Green Tribunal includes both experts and
judicial members.n Another interesting case is the Israeli Water Court which
sits on all matters referred to it by the Water Law and the Drainage and
Floods Control Law of 1959.9' In this court, a three-member panel, comprised
of a district court judge who presides and two representatives of the general
public, decides on cases. This composition reflects the public relevance of
water for the society at large. Appeals to Water Court decisions are decided
by the Supreme Court."
2. Connection with OtherAreas of the Law
One critique of specialized courts is that they become siloed and that
they are not permeable to the legal developments in other areas; instead,
they suffer from tunnel vision or myopia.96 In contrast, if cases are heard by
general courts, judges may transplant legal doctrines from other areas.9 7 It is
hard to measure whether the potential loss of borrowing between areas of
the law is significant. First, savvy lawyers for the parties may bring up
doctrines from other legal areas in their documents and pleadings. Second,
borrowing from other areas of law could also have unintended effects. It
may be the case that doctrines do not translate well between even similar
areas of law. For example, even between two quite similar natural resources
like oil and groundwater, applying the same rule may not be always
advisable. The rule of capture was applied to the allocation of rights over oil
91 Id at 181.
92 Id.
93 Chaturvedi, supra note 8; see also Amirante, supra note 8, at 463-64. The minimum
composition of the Tribunal, as per section 4, will vary from twenty-one to forty-one members: a
chairperson (judicial), ten to twenty full-time judicial members, ten to twenty expert members,
all chosen by the Central Government Amirante, supra note 8, at 463-64. In the Tribunal there
will be a balanced mix of judges and technical experts, with strict qualifications. The "green
judges" have to be holders of a Master in Science with a Doctorate Degree (in the fields of
physical sciences and life sciences) or a Master of Engineering or Technology, and must have,
as per section 5(2)(a) of the Act, a minimum of fifteen years of experience in a relevant field,
including five years of practical experience in the field of environment and forest. Id. The
experts may also come from the administrative field, with the requirement of "administrative
experience of fifteen years including experience of five years in dealing with environmental
matters in the Central or a State Government or in a reputed National or State level institution,"
also including members from civil society organizations (NGOs and others). Id.
94 Richard Laster & Dan Livney, Israel. The Evolution of Water Law and Policy, in THE
EVOLUTION OF THE LAW AND POLITICS OF WATER 121, 126 (Joseph F. Dellapenna & Joyeeta Gupta,
eds. 2008)
95 Id
96 Cheng, supra note 11, at 526.
97 Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 17.
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reservoirs.9 Then, it was transferred to another underground resource,
groundwater, and it has resulted in overexploitation of groundwater
99
resources.
If lack of permeability is a relevant problem, it could be mitigated by
creating specialized courts within the existing court system, much like the
Colorado Water Courts or the Patent Pilot Program. In the former, state
judges in each division may be assigned as water judges and keep sitting on
other cases.'0 In the latter, judges in each district were assigned to be patent
judges.'0 ' The Colorado example solves the isolation of water judges and
ensures permeability. The Patent Pilot Program design solves the isolation
problem less so because, for a while, patent judges will only focus on those
cases and, depending on the length of their assignment, their actual
knowledge of other areas of the law may become outdated. However, if a
specialized court also requires different procedures, a hybrid model may be
hard to implement. Furthermore, if the new system of courts does not
require expertise in the particular area of the law to be appointed as a judge,
choosing practitioners from other areas may, at least temporarily, ensure
certain permeability by doctrines from different legal areas.
In addition, if review by general judges exists at some point in the
process, the lack of permeability may be somewhat cured. However, general
judges may feel the need to defer to specialist judges. This is to an extent
what happens today when general courts defer not to judges, but to
appointed special masters,"°2 figures whose presence in litigation have grown
significantly in the past decades.'0
Another expression of the connection between the specialized court
and other areas of the law is whether the legal issues that the specialized
court has the power to decide on, both in terms of expertise and
geographical jurisdiction, are heavily interrelated with matters under the
jurisdiction of other courts.'°4 That is, whether the specialized court will
frequently face questions that are under the jurisdiction of a general court
and the process will need to be stayed while the general court decides on
those issues. The need to stay a case while another court decides on the
linked issue may wipe out the celerity benefit, and it may increase
transaction costs for private parties because they will need to appear before
two different courts.'Y
98 Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Texas 1904)
99 See Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971) (applying the Accommodation of
States Doctrine, an oil and gas doctrine, to groundwater).
100 Thorsen, supra note 22, at 24.
101 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 40,.at 2.
102 L. Elizabeth Sarine, The Supreme Court's Problematic Deference to Special Masters in
Interstate WaterDisputes, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 535,540, 546 & n.82 (2012).
103 Shira Scheindlin, We Need Help: The Increasing Use of Special Masters in Federal Court
58 DEPAUL L. REV. 479, 479-80 (2009).
104 See Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 437.




a Separate or Hybid Models
There is a continuum between lack of specialization in general courts
and a full-fledged system of courts for just a particular area of the law. In
fact, there is a previous step: there can be adjudicatory, independent bodies
within an administrative agency that review the decisions of that agency or
other agencies."' Those administrative law judges or courts have been left
out in this Article. While they may guarantee a fair procedure and reduce the
need for review before a court, there may still be cases going to court. Also,
outside the continuum, there is another form of specialization: special
masters.7 Beyond the use of expert testimony, courts often resort to special
masters to deal with the more difficult cases."' Special masters have a quasi-
judicial role and help judges build the record."'O The special master is often
used in complex litigation. 0
Along the continuum, first, even when cases are heard by general
courts, some benches or judges become de facto specialized in particular
areas either because those cases arise more often in certain jurisdictions or
because those venues are chosen because of some perceived advantages."'
This describes pretty well the situation of the Delaware Court of Chancery, a
court at equity which has been a key part of Delaware's success in corporate
governance."2 While their docket does not exclusively include corporate
106 See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudcation in Independent Thbunals: The Role of an
Alternative Agency Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965 (1991) (providing an overview of
administrative law tribunals).
107 In fact, special masters have been considered a better alternative than specialized courts.
See The Environmental Court Proposal- Requiem, Analysis, and Counterproposal, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 676, 692, 696 (1975).
108 Special masters are regulated under Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This
rule gives judges a lot of flexibility regarding the tasks that they may assign to the special
masters-from addressing pre-trial issues for which the court does not have time to make
findings of fact in non-jury issues or perform difficult damages calculations. They are often used
when the case deals with a particularly technical area of the law. See David R. Cohen, The
Judge, the Special Master, and You, LITGATION Q.J., Summer 2014, at 33. It is important not to
confuse this with the Special Masters, established by the National Vaccine Injury Compensation
Program of 1986, which works in the United States Court of Federal Claims to administer the
"no-fault compensation program whereby petitions for monetary compensation may be brought
by or on behalf of persons allegedly suffering injury or death as a result of the administration of
certain compulsory childhood vaccines" and who operate under a "philosophy of guidance,
cooperative effort, informality, and reasonable speed in presenting and deciding the case."
Vaccine Claims/Office ofSpecialMasters, U.S. CouRT FED. CLAMS, https://perma.cc/G76G-WK9Z
(last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
109 FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c).
110 See Cohen, supra note 108, at 33.
111 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 40, at 38.




cases, those make the lion share of it." 3 De facto specialization has also
occurred in the Eastern District of Texas for patent law.1
4
Second, there can be specialized judges in regular courts; that is, some
judges could be assigned the cases in specific areas.5 Those judges could
either already be experts on those areas or become experts as a result of
repeated interaction with those areas. A version of this can be found in
federal appellate courts where opinions in certain areas are assigned to
particular judges even though federal judges have often been critics of
specialization.n6 Their areas of specialization are often explained by their
background prior to sitting on the court."7 Those judges that write more
opinions on certain areas still write in other areas as a result of random
panel assignments.18 For example, Judge Ronald Gould on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit shows a clear preference for
environmental opinions"" and Judge Stephen F. Williams on the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, formerly an oil-and-gas
professor,u° focuses on Federal Energy Regulatory Commission opinions."'
This hybrid system where general judges de facto specialize while
remaining generalists would ensure that court procedure is homogeneous
with other areas of the law and that judges are still permeable to lessons
from other legal subjects. Apart from this assignment of specific specialized
cases to specific judges, the hybrid system has been tried in a pilot project in
patent law. Patent law is an area where the need for specialization can be
considered acute. While there are already instances of specialization, namely
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, there was a
patent law pilot program to assess whether specialization within federal
district courts would improve the current situation where judicial backlog
negatively impacts innovation." Piggybacking on the existing court system
should mitigate a concern often raised against specialized courts: their
disconnection with the population because they may not be geographically
113 Omari Scott Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder Delaware's Dominance and the
Market for Corporate Law, 42 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 1129, 1163 n.151 (2008) ("Approximately 70%
of the cases before the Delaware Court of Chancery are corporate matters.").
114 Until 2017, plaintiffs, mostly "patent-trolls," in patent infringement cases practiced forum-
shopping and brought those cases in the Eastern District of Texas. See WILLIAMS ET AL, SUpra
note 40, at 29-30. The Supreme Court's decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group
Brands LLC, put an end to this practice. 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1517 (2017).
115 See Bettina Boxall, The Man with HMs Hand on California's Spigo L.A. TIMES (Oct 7,
2011), https://permacc/GS4Z-44UH (providing an example of a specialized judge in a U.S.
District Court).
116 For an empirical study proving the specialization via opinion writing, see generally
Cheng, supra note 11.
117 Id at 541.
118 Id at 540.
119 Id. at 538.
120 Id at 542.
121 Id. at 540. The DC Circuit opinion specialization is assessed across agencies instead of
across subject-matters. Id. at 547.
122 For the five-year report on the program, see generally WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 40.
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close'23 if their docket only warrants one, or a few at most, central
specialized courts.
One final piece to take into account when designing a specialized court
system is the need to clearly define the boundaries of its jurisdiction. In




Judicial systems have several levels to ensure that there are instances
of review. A specialized court system could replicate the general courts
system. In some cases, though, such structure would not be justified. It
would not be justified because it may not be necessary to have specialization
at all levels.' Specialization is needed where complexity lies. In some legal
areas, complexity may reside only on the facts that require experts to
explain, because they are full of technicalities, scientific information, novel
data, etc. If that is the case, specialization will be necessary only at the trial
court level. '2 On the contrary, in other legal areas, the difficulty lies in the
regulations or doctrines to be applied.'n this case, the specialization makes
more sense at the appellate level because that level should be able to cure
the mistakes of inferior courts when necessary.2 Some areas, as shall be
seen, suffer from both.
Having a specialized court system with different levels would allow
judges to be promoted in the system and, thus, they may be concerned about
their reputation and try to enact high-quality judicial decisions that will not
be reversed.'2
c. Tenure and Promotion
State and federal judges offer different models for a judicial career. At
the risk of simplification, there are three variables that, when combined, give
different models of a judicial career: 1) who selects the judges, 2) what are
the criteria of selection, and 3) how long is their term. How these are
combined impacts how attractive a position is. First, judges can be selected
by the public in an election, a commission of experts or of legislators, or the
top executive-governor or president-with some input from the
legislator.'3° Who selects them partially defines the criteria for selection.
123 See Garoupa et al., supra note 33, at 55 tbl.1.
124 Laster & Livney, supra note 94, at 127.
125 Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 428-29.
126 Id at 411.
127 Id
128 Id
129 Garoupa et al., supra note 33, at 55.
130 See e.g., Judicial Selection in the States, BALLOTPEDIA, https://permacc/H8EP-5MNB (last
visited Apr. 13, 2019).
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Beyond having a legal education and whatever other constitutional
requirements are set for judges, and depending on the selection method,
likely either their ideology or their expertise will matter the most. Judges
can be appointed with life tenure or elected, appointed for a limited term, or
even appointed but subject to retention election."' For a specialized court,
expertise should be the main criteria that most of the benefits hinge on.
Hence, election is not advisable as the primary selection method. However,
an election could be held to choose from a short list of experts nominated by
a commission. Additionally, a general election would give many who will not
be users of the specialized courts a say. But there may be cases were it is
feasible that only those who will particularly use the specialized court
system will vote. This is the model that the traditional courts of
Southeastern Spain use.12
The choice between life tenure and limited term will depend on other
design variables. First, the risk of capture counsels against limited term.
Judges who will be out of-the job in a few years may be willing to favor those
potential future employers, and those employers will likely be either
defendants or plaintiffs in the cases the judges sit on.M Second, if the system
chosen is one where judges acquire experience once the specialized court
exists, then cases will take longer to be decided at the beginning and the
duration will decrease as the expertise of sitting judges' increases."'
Inevitably, cases will require fewer judge hours as expertise increases." For
expertise to build up, judges need to serve for at least some period of time.
Hence, if a limited term is the model chosen, in a collegial judicial body, the
replacement should be staggered not to undo all the benefits from the gain in
expertise. Life tenure would achieve the same goal while at the same time
reducing the potential risk of capture.
Where the hybrid model is adopted, it would seem that there would be
little choice as to the requirements for those judges because they will be
regular state judges.37 But there are other models available. Non-Article III
judges, that is the judges who, contrary to federal judges, do not enjoy
tenure and salary protection, offer other models. In fact, most specialized
courts have not been granted Article I status. Non-Article I judges
include, among others, judges of United States Bankruptcy Courts, the
United States Tax Court, or the United States Court of Federal Claims. All of
those judges serve for specified terms of office. In the case of the United
States Bankruptcy Courts, the specialized courts are divisions of the ninety-
four U.S. district courts, but the judges are chosen by the Courts of Appeals
131 See e.g., How are Judgas Selected?, FIN)LAw, https'/permacc/MC6H-N2JK (last visited
Apr. 13, 2019).
132 See discussion infra Part IV.
133 Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 377, 379, 422-23.
134 See Stephan I. Vladeck & John C. Eastman, Setting Term Limits for Supreme Court
Would Bring Too Many Polhitcal Problems, DALLASNEWS (Mar. 7, 2017), https://perm&cc/5UYF-
Y8E3 (discussing the downfalls of term limits).
135 Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 377-79.
136 Id at 378.
137 See discussion supm Part ILC.3.a
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of each circuit for a term of fourteen years1n The appointment process
varies slightly from circuit to circuit but there are Merit Selection Panels in
all circuits. The judges are selected on the basis of merit and have been
regarded as one of the most expert benches in the United States.'"
4. Procedure
While specialized courts may just use the general rules of civil or
criminal procedure, they could also craft rules that better suit their
specialized subject matter. A specialized procedure may reduce transaction
costs even further and boost celerity.'4 In fact, celerity could be further
advanced if the court was allowed to prioritize between cases depending on
the imminent need. This can be particularly necessary in areas such as
environmental law.
41
A specialized procedure can also be problematic. Third parties not
participating in the cases decided by specialized courts may still be affected
by those decisions. If those decisions are reached using a trans-substantive
procedure, those third parties affected may have more confidence in the
decision.'" A procedure specifically designed for specialized courts could be
perceived as biased in favor of certain interests and less open to considering
all sides.'" In fact, this was the perception of the specific procedures of the
International Trade Commission which deviated from the procedures of
district courts in order to reach quicker decisions." Both the fairness of the
procedure and the perception of fairness are important.
However, if due process requirements (notice, opportunity to be heard,
compulsory process, and a neutral adjudicator)'" are met, procedural
particularities may help achieve the gains in efficiency and quality that the
establishment of specialized courts aim to achieve. Environmental law,
which broadly understood encompasses water issues, is an area where
collaboration brings the best results.1" This is shown by the hearings at the
138 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2018).
139 See Reddick & Knowlton, supra note 83, at 1-3.
140 See discussion supra Part IIA
141 However, Ellen R. Jordan argues against this point in her 1981 article given the
fundamental choices that we have to make in environmental law and the substantial unknowns.
Jordan, supra note 18, at 765 ("Where no national consensus yet exists, however, as in
environmental law and health and safety regulation, the far-reaching and irreversible nature of'
the choices to be made demands that decisions be reached deliberately and carefully. In those
areas, the speed and efficiency of the specialist may be exactly the wrong prescription, since it
is wisdom and deliberation, combined with a full hearing from all affected interests, which is
needed."). While this may have been true in the 80s and while we may agree that a consensus
may never be reached, environmental disasters, the irreversibility of many environmental
decisions, and the time pressure of many environmental issues suggests that swift adjudication
could be positive.
142 Dreyfuss, supra note 6, at 15-16.
143 Id at 16.
144 Id
145 Id at 15.
146 The recovery of the grizzly bears in the Yellowstone area was brought about state
agencies, federal agencies, tribes, and stakeholder groups working together to ensure that the
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Swedish Environmental Court of Appeals, which are described as "more like
a general meeting than like an appellate court proceeding,"47 with their lack
of a requirement for parties to be represented by an attorney." Thus, the
trust in a specialized court may further reduce the costs for the parties, as
they may not need either an attorney or their own expert to battle the other
party's expert.49 Or, trust in a specialized court may allow the battle of the
experts to occur in a "hottubbing" fashion, as Judge Brian Preston from the
Land and Environment Court of New South Wales put it.1 u In that forum,
experts are asked to give concurrent testimony to figure out the issues that
they agree and disagree on and then only focus on the conflictive points.5'
Finally, specialized courts could be more open to the use of alternative
dispute resolution methods.'52 The Land and Environment Court of New
South Wales has been conceived as a one-stop-shop where disputes get
solved with a portfolio of methods.' 3 Such a portfolio also encourages
innovative decision making on both procedural and substantive issues. 5
El. WHY WATER COURTS?
Specialized courts are justified either when the facts or the law in a
particular area are complex9u The former, complex facts, justifies
specialized trial courts and the latter, complex law, specialized appellate
courts. ' Water courts can be justified on both grounds-the technical
knowledge required to deal with the facts and the complexity of the legal
doctrines. In fact, many water cases have a lot in common with complex
litigation'57-the number of parties, the need for experts, and the complexity
bears were not extinct. See Story of the IGBC, INTERAGENCY GRIZZLY BEAR COMMITTEE,
https://perma.cc/PE4Q-D62P (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
147 BjhlAs, supra note 30, at 182.
148 Id
149 Jan Darp6, Justice Through the Environmental Courts? Lessons Learned from the
Swedish Experience, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND JUSTICE IN CONTEXT 176, 183 (Jonas Ebbesson
& Phoebe Okowa eds., Cambridge University Press 2009).
150 PRING & PRING, supra note 19, at 60.
151 Id at 56.
152 Id at 50.
153 Preston, supra note 45, at 411,412.
154 Id at 425.
155 Dreyfuss, supra note 47, at 411.
156 Id
157 William A. Hillhouse II & Barbara T. Andrews, Management of the Complex Water Case
31 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L INST. 24, § 24.01 (2017).
'Complex litigation' is the category of cases requiring more intensive judicial
management Complexity may be determined by multiple parties, multiple attorneys,
geographically dispersed plaintiffs and defendants, numerous expert witnesses, complex
subject matter, complicated testimony concerning causation, procedural complexity,
complex substantive law, extensive discovery, choice of law, requisites of a class-
certification order, complex damage determinations, diversity, and res judicata
implications for plaintiffs not within the proposed class. Mass torts and class actions are
examples of two types of well-known complex actions.
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of the legal issues. Water rights are interdependent and the actions by one
water right user may affect a myriad of other water right holders. This is also
the case when a water agency makes a decision that affects more than one
user in a stream.
The need for particular fact-finding is illustrated by the need for expert
testimony,'5 such as engineers, biologists, hydrologists, or agricultural
economists. The bench needs to be educated. Parties spend considerable
funds in expert testimony. Justice Story, sitting in the United States Circuit
Court for the District of Rhode Island in 1826, described Tyler v. Wilkinson59
as "a very important case, complicated in facts and voluminous in
testimony,"'° Tyler v. Wilkinson "involved the right of certain mill owners to
divert water from the Pawtucket River through a trench; the complainants
were other mill owners who owned mills on the river, and who challenged
this diversion as being injurious to their mills. " "' Tyler v. Wilkinson is a
pretty average water case that tested the riparian system of water rights
from the eastern United States. The complexity is compounded in the West
by the scarcity of water resources. Another illustration, this time from
California, comes from Tulare Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore
Irrigation Distric4 a 1935 case of the California Supreme Court.'62 The long
litigation that led to this decision had a transcript record of 26,936 pages and
678 exhibits9
The case was rendered very complex for the reason that respondents are many
in number and own, or claim to own, a variety of water rights on approximately
200,000 acres of land. Some of the respondents are appropriators, some are
riparian owners, and some are owners of overlying land, owning or claiming to
own underground water rights. Sixteen of the respondents are corporations
Complex Litigation Resource Guide, NAT'L CTt STATE COuRTS, https://perma.cc/Z6A2-MRJZ
(last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
158 Hillhouse II & Andrews, supra note 157.
159 24 F. Cas. 472 (D. R.I. 1827).
160 T.E. Lauer, The Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 MO. L. REV. 60, 60
(1963).
161 Id
162 Tulare Irrigation Dist. et al. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal. 1935)
163 Id
In Lindsay-Strathm ore Irigation District v. Supenror Court, the contentions of petitioner
there (defendant here) were sustained, and a writ of prohibition was issued restraining
Judge Wallace from taking any further action in the case, and ordering a new trial. The
case again proceeded to trial, this time before Judge Albert Lee Stephens. During the
course of this trial, consuming over 200 court days, a reporter's transcript of 56 volumes,
containing 26,936 pages, was compiled, and some 678 exhibits were introduced. The
findings of fact and conclusions of law, covering 236 pages of the clerk's transcript, were
filed May 16, 1925, and judgment was thereafter rendered on April 13, 1926, in favor of
plaintiffs and interveners. Counsel consumed over five years in the preparation of briefs,
which, without their accompanying supplements, total 1,957 pages. Now, some eighteen




distributing appropriated water to their hundreds of stockholders; 1 respondent
is an irrigation district, also distributing appropriated water to its landowners;
30 are individual appropriators, alleged to hold rights in the water as tenants in
common; and 13 claim both as riparian owners and overlying landowners.
Different questions of law were presented to the trial court and are now
presented here, in reference to each class of respondent.'
But beyond the technical complexity, water cases, like water
management, call for boots on the ground. While all cases require judges to
learn the facts, water is very much tied to the place and the context where it
appears. There are many expressions of this link in water management. For
example, in the regular administration of water, there are figures, like water
commissioners, which administer the day-to-day decisions on certain
streams.1' A water management agency is not close enough to the end users
of water. A water court must ensure closeness to the facts.'6 Thus, just a
centralized institution would not be ideal. Some existing examples of water
courts have different territorial divisions and often do site visits to clarify
the facts.6 7 This decentralized system at the trial level also increases access
to justice, which is one effect that special courts can have when taking cases
from general district courts.' Alternatively, in order to really understand the
problem, the court could visit the sites as the Environmental Court of Appeal
does in Sweden."'
Regarding the legal complexity, a quote from the movie Milagro
Beanfield War sums it up: "nobody even understands the water laws."7 '
Water law is complex because it combines historical doctrines from
different origins with a thorough regulatory apparatus and must respond to
164 Id at 975
165 "Local water users can petition for a water commissioner after the water rights in a basin
have been verified by the Montana Water Court. The commissioner ensures that daily water
allocations in the basin occur in accordance with the users' rights. The local district court
appoints the commissioner, and oversees his work." MONT. WATERCOURSE AT THE MONT. WATER
CTR., WHO DOES WHAT TO MONTANA'S WATER 24 (2014), https/perma.cc/23DG-QKMA. The figure
of the water commissioner also appears in Colorado. This "boots on the ground" official is in
charge of water distribution implementing the water court decrees. CoL. FOUND. FOR WATER
EDUC., CITIZEN'S GuiDE TO COLORADO WATER LAW 17 (2004), https://perma.cc/3WK6-WY6G. These
commissioners are employees of the state engineer and can become parties to litigation if
individuals disagree with the decision. Id. Their role is described as: "[i]t is the primary job of
the water commissioners to go into the field and distribute the waters of the state. This involves
monitoring headgates, responding to calls for water, issuing orders to reduce and cease
diversions." Id
166 Id at 12-13.
167 Id at 12, 17.
168 See, e.g., Darp6, supra note 149, at 192 (looking at Swedish environmental courts to
conclude that increased access to justice can be achieved through "a broad consideration of
issues at an early stage, when all actors have their say and all interests can be invoked").
169 BjllAs, supra note 30, at 182.
170 EL MILAGRO BEANFIEI WAR (MCA Universal Home Video 1988) (when the developers
are trying to find a strategy to get rid of Jose Mondragon and the opposition to their new project
in Milagro, they believe he is misusing the water who does not belong to him. One of the Forest
Service cops states this sentence) (at 22min 8").
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the intricacies of the water cycle.'71 The physical nature of the subject
regulated-water-thus often contributes to the complexity of these cases.
Parties must resort to a water lawyer to help them navigate the legal
doctrines, both when facing an administrative proceeding and when facing a
court proceeding, whether or not the court allows self-representation.172
Perhaps more illustrative of the fact that judges, at all levels, do not feel
comfortable making the necessary judicial decisions, is the mechanisms they
use to reduce the number of judge-hours that water law cases could take.
They often appoint special masters to try the cases and make a
recommendation to the court, or water law cases get assigned to a particular
judge with more experience in water issues.1"3
Special masters often make the whole litigation enterprise more
expensive and private parties usually pay their compensation.74 Special
masters may gather facts, deal with expert testimony, and make
recommendations to the court.175 Particularly illustrative of the case
complexity and the fact that judges are not comfortable with water law is
the role of special masters in interstate compact disputes before the
Supreme Court.1 6 The Supreme Court does not get a factual record for
original jurisdiction cases and it uses special masters to gather the facts.17'
The role of special masters has increased progressively178 and there is no
clear regulation about what powers those masters may exercise. In water
cases, the Court tends to issue substantive opinions which hardly deviate
from the masters' recommendations. In water and beyond, special masters
tend to be those acquainted with the judges or Justices.'79 Focusing on
Supreme Court masters, water law stands out. While, in general, the Justices
appoint judges to perform the special master functions,"s° in interstate
compact disputes they appoint mostly water law experts-attorneys or
scholars-who have not been judges,'8' showing expertise takes precedence
over judicial experience.
The second mechanism that suggests the need for specialized courts, or
at least illustrates the technicality- of the field, is the assignment of water
cases to particular judges within a jurisdiction. This is what happened in
California. Many cases dealing with water rights were assigned to Judge
171 Hillhouse II & Andrews, supra note 157, at § 24.01.
172 See, e.g., id. at § 24.01 (explaining the litigation skills needed to for administrative and
court proceedings).
173 See Boxall, supra note 115.
174 FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
175 Sarine, supra note 102, at 550-51.
176 Id at 553-55.
177 Id. at 550.
178 Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of the Judicial Process: Special Masters
in the Court's OrginalJudsdicton Cases, 86 MiNN. L REv. 625, 627-28 (2002).
179 Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitmacy of Special Masters, 2 WID. L. SYMP. J.
235, 276 (1997).
180 Carstens, supra note 178, at 645.
181 Id. at 648; see also Sarine, supra note 102, at 553 (from a sample of interstate water




Oliver Wanger, whose opinions have been described as scientific papers.12
He presided over hundreds of cases, among those the high-proffle Delta
cases where the flows from Northern California to Southern California were
at stake. According to some, Judge Wanger is the person who most
influenced California's water policy in the 1990s and 2000s."3 He was
perceived as a fair judge,"M probably thanks to his combination of judicial
skills and substantive water law knowledge. While this is true in California,
in Colorado, judges siting on water courts are just judges from the general
court in the same division."' The substantive knowledge and experience-
and the opportunity to accumulate experience-are similar to that of Judge
Wanger. However, in the case of Colorado, no judge is singled out because
they only deal with the water cases in their division, putting on their water
judge hat instead of the general judge hat for that particular case; therefore,
there are fewer opportunities to accumulate specialized water law
experience.
A final illustration of the particularities of water law cases, both in
terms of the science behind it and the law itself, is Dividing the Waters'
Dividing the Waters is an organization created in 1993 with links to the
National Judicial College and the Federal Judicial Center. Dividing the
Waters aims to "prepar[e] the judges of today and tomorrow-across the
nation-to apply the law, science, good judgment, and wisdom in efficiently
and effectively adjudicating water-related cases, to meet human and
environmental needs."1 87 To do so it convenes a network of judges, special
masters, and referees involved in water litigation and encourages every
judge facing a water case to join the discussion."" It has received funding,
among others, from foundations such as the Ford, Hewlett, and Bechtel
foundations and state governments, which further highlights the relevance
that these donors assign to water cases.1M This program helps train judges on
water issues via conferences, workshops, and webinars where they receive
information from other judges and scholars."
Finally, in this analysis of "why" water courts, the "where" of water
courts needs to be addressed. It is difficult to define, exactly, what a water
issue is. However, that problem is common to any division of labor across
the judiciary. Even at risk of oversimplification, water rights are regulated at
182 Boxall, supra note 115.
183 Id; see also Gosia Wozniacka, Oliver Wanger Stepping Down as Federal Judge, SFGATE
(Sept. 25, 2011), https://perma.cJYF9U-8GNP.
184 Wozniacka, supra note 183 (quoting Bill Jennings of the California Sportfishing
Protection Alliance).
185 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-203 (2018).
186 Dividing the Wateza, NAT'L JUDICIAL COLL., https'//perma.cc/5GL3-P4YV (last visited Apr.
13, 2019).
187 Id; see also About DTJI NAT'L JUDICIAL COLL., https://permacc/2B82-MDM4 (last visited
Apr. 13, 2019).
188 Dividing the Waters, supra note 186.
189 About D7'W, supra note 187.




the state level while water pollution is regulated at the federal level-
although implemented under a cooperative federalism framework.9' This
implies that water courts could be implemented at either the state or federal
level. However, the focus in this piece would be at the state level where the
trend toward specialized institutions is taking place in water and beyond. In
particular, institutional innovation is happening and it is likely to continue in
states where water is scarce and thus valuable. Furthermore, those states
could act as laboratories and other states may learn from their successes.
IV. SOUTHEASTERN SPAIN WATER COURTS
Water Courts in southeastern Spain, namely the Council of Wise Men of
the Plain of Murcia and the Water Tribunal of the Plain of Valencia, are
consuetudinary institutions that have gained international attention.192 The
institutions were declared part of the Intangible Cultural Heritage by the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in 2009.'93
In scholarship, the institutions are well known, thanks to the work of Maas
and Anderson,'9' which is cited in the famous work by Elinor Ostrom,
Governzng the Commons. 6 These courts have a long history and have been
able to adapt to changing times. For example, the Valencian court may have
Roman or Arab origins and has survived until today, surviving even during
the Franco dictatorship years."6 But these courts are not small, isolated
institutions. The Council of Wise Men has jurisdiction over 23,313 members
and the Water Tribunal over 11,691 members.97 The lands served by the
Valencian acequias are one of the most important areas producing fruits and
vegetables in Spain.9
191 Regulatory Infonraton by Topic: Water, U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://perma.cc/N3DK-SX86 (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
192 DANIEL SALA GINER, CONTESTACI DE L'ACADEMIC DE NUMERO DE LA REAL ACQADEMIA DE
CULTURA VALENCIANA AL DISCURS LLEGIT EN LA SEUA RECEPCIO PER L'ILM. SR. EN. JOSE BONET
NAVARRO [RESPONSE BY THE NUMBERED ACADEMIC OF THE VALENCIAN CULTURE ACADEMY TO THE
DISCOURSE BY MR. JOSE BONET NAVARRO] 81 (2014), https://perma.cc/A6PM-ZYXF.
193 Decision of the Intergovermenta Committee: 4. COM 13.70, U.N. EDUC., SCI. CULTURAL
ORG., https://permacc/44AV-9GEW (last visited Apr. 13, 2019) [hereinafter UNESCO Decision].
194 ARTHUR MAAS & RAYMOND L ANDERSON,... AND THE DESERT SHALL REJOICE: CONFLICT,
GROWTH, AND JUSTICE IN ARID ENVIRONMENTS 22-23,82-83 (1978).
195 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 73-74, 77 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1990).
196 History of Valencia: History of the City, INSTITUTO ESPAROL DE ARQUITECTURA Y
URBANISMO, https://perma.cc/A6GR-WWPC (last visited Apr. 13, 2019) (discussing Roman and
Arab roots in Valencia); see also Francisco Franco, HISTORY, https://permacc7JXW-286W (last
visited Apr. 13, 2019) (demonstrating that Francisco Franco was dictator of Spain from 1939
until he died in 1975).
197 UNESCO Decision, supra note 193.
198 RICARDO J. SERVER IZQUIERDO ET AL, CUESTIONES REFERENTES AL SECTOR CITRICOLA MAS
RELEVANTES PARA LA DEFINICI6N DE LA POLfrICA DE SEGUROS AGRARIOS: SITUACION ACTUAL Y
TENDENCIAS A CORTO Y MEDIO PLAZO (2009), https://permacc/4XCM-58BT; see also, INE,
ENCUESTA SOBRE SUPERFICES Y RENDIMIENTOS DE CULTIVOS DE ESPARA (2018),
https://permacc/3DXP-7CY9.
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These institutions are independent judicial tribunals even though they
are formally part of the basin organizations that they serve in,'9 but they
exercise judicial power.2n Understanding their strengths is helpful to identify
the features that any form of specialized water courts should have. While the
water courts existing in southeastern Spain cannot be immediately
transplanted to the United States, there are features of its institutional role,
procedure, and composition that may inspire reforms in the U.S. water
courts or imbue future water courts. In fact, these water courts inspired the
Spanish regulation of other irrigation communities where Irrigation Juries
were established. This regulation was transplanted to Latin America.20'
To understand the role of these courts, the water allocation system of
the area needs to be briefly described. The irrigation areas that these courts
serve are organized in acequias, an institution that was transplanted to New
Mexico, among other places.202 The acequias are irrigation communities.
Each acequia is formed by all those who receive water from a canal that
diverts water from the river to the different fields.2 3 The Valencia Water
Tribunal has jurisdiction over seven acequias20' and the Council of Wise Men
in Murcia has jurisdiction over two large acequias, the heredamiento norte
199 Victor Fair6n Guil6n, Breve examen del Tribunal de las Aguas de Valencia y de su
proceso, 691 ARBOR 1295, 1297 (2003).
200 Spanish Constitutional Court Decision STC 113/2004, of July 12, in relation to the Council
of Wise Men, but also applicable to the Valencia Water Tribunal, declared its operation
constitutional and providing due process:
[The Wise Men Council] presents the objective and formal elements that characterize a
Judicial process. To verify this, it is sufficient to note that, according to the aforementioned
Regulation, the Council of Wise Men solves "all questions of fact and lawsuits filed between
the inigators of the Community," through application to the case of Ordinances and Customs
of the Huerta de Murcia... And all this, in addition, in public session and through a verbal
procedure, that although brief and summary, guarantees the principles of hearing,
contradiction and evidence..., and that allows the parties to obtain "in the same session in
which you consider[the demand] or in the next, at the latest" . . . , a decision on the merits on
the claims deducted for all purposes of res judicata.... In these conditions, there is no doubt
that the jurisdictional activity of the Council fully satisfies the fundamental right of art. 24.1
Spanish Constitution [due process].
Id.; see also CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SPAIN, HISTORY OF THE COURT: AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW
ON THE CONSTrrUTIONAL COURT (2016), https://perma.cc/Q62X-GUHX (For the Wise Men Council,
the condition of judicial tribunal was given by a reform of the Judiciary Organic Act from 1999.
Before it was considered an administrative organ, and thus its decisions were reviewable by the
administrative law courts (setting aside specialized courts, the Spanish judiciary has four equal
branches: civil, criminal, labor, and administrative courts)).
201 Les Comunidades de Regantesy el Tribunal de las Aguas de Valencia, EL TRIBUNAL DE LAS
AGUAS DE VALENCIA, https://perma.cc/E72H-KNRN (last visited Apr. 13, 2019) [hereinafter
VALENCIA WATER TRIBUNAL]; see also MAQNO TULIO SANDOVAL, LEGISLACION DE AGUAS EN AMtRICA
CENTRAL, CARIBE Y Mtxico 27, 79, 121, 161,167 (1975).
202 Jos6 A. Rivera & Thomas F. Glick, Acequias and Their Iberian Orgins: Iberian Onigins of
New Mexico's Community Acequias, N.M. OFF. STATE HISTORLN, https://permacc/M45T-8NFF
(last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
203 VALENCIA WATER TRIBUNAL, supra note 201.
204 Las Acequas, TRIBUNAL DE LAS AGUAS DE LA VEGA DE VALENCIA, https://permacc92PD-
DDP3 (last visited Apr. 13, 2019) (explaining that the acequias under the jurisdiction of the
Valencia Water Tribunal are: Quart and Ben~ger-Faitanar, Tormos, Mislata, Mestalla, Favara,
Rascanya and Rovella, all of which get water from the Turia River).
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and the heredamiento sur.an The amount of water assigned to the acequia is
owned in common by the irrigators.2°" The acequias' regulations
("ordenanzas") are dated from time immemorial and were initially oral until
they were codified.m According to those ordinances, each irrigator receives
water according to the amount of land he possesses.2  When water
quantities are low or insufficient, water is proportionally apportioned
depending on the amount available."n The "ordenanzas" establish the rights
and duties of the irrigator, such as the right to receive water at a certain time
periodically or the duty to clean up the canals.10
Each acequia has an elected head, the Sindic, and a board that
administers the water."' The Sindic must be one of the irrigators with a good
reputation and it is automatically a member of the Water Tribunal.212 The
board is composed by irrigators of the different parts of the acequia canals:
upstream or closer to the uptake, middle, and downstream.2 3 In addition,
there are the "wardens," a figure similar to the commissioners in certain U.S.
Western states, who enforce the Sindic's instructions and monitor the
irrigators for cheating.21 4 If the irrigators are cheating, the warden must
inform the Board and pursue an action against the irrigator before the
tribunal.
216
Even though Spain adopted a unitary judicial system with the arrival of
democracy in the late 1970s, a system which is not familiar with special
courts, the Council of Wise Men and the Water Tribunal are the exception.2 6
Their decisions cannot be appealed to the general judicial system.2 7 Their
exceptionality is even more striking in the fact that there are no written
regulations about the water courts' procedure and operation2 8 an anomaly
205 Acequias de la Huerta de Murcia ACEQUIAS DEL CONSEJO DE HOMBRES BUENOS,
https-J/perma&cc/62FX-MEZR (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
206 VALENCIA WATER TRIBUNAL, supra note 201.
207 Id For more information about the ordinances, see Daniel S. Giner, El Ihbunal de las
Aguas de )a Vega de Valencia (Water Tribunal of the Valencian Meadow) 231, 231-47 (2013).








216 SPANISH CONST., art. 122, Dec. 27, 1978 (Spain); see aso L.O.P.J art. 19 (1985) (Spain).
217 Julia A. Hudson-Richards & Cynthia A. Gonzales, Water as a Colective Responsiblity.
The Tribunal de las Aguas and the Valencian Community, 38 J. ASS'N. SPANISH & PORTUGUESE
HIST. STUD. 1, 95 (2013).
218 Jose Bonet Navarro, Unitat de Fur i Tribunal de les Aigues. Un eixemple de resistencia
valenciana. Discurs ilegit el dia 17 de decembre de 2014 en la seua recepcio com a academic de
numero Per I Contestacio De L'academic de Numero de la Real Academia de Cultura Valenciana
[Unity of Forum and the Valencian Water Trubunal. An example of Valencian resistance. Speech




for any judicial system in a functioning democracy. However, the ordinances
of each acequia re written.1 9
In Valencia, the court is composed of one judge from each of the nine
acequias, and they select a president and a vice-president among
themselves.220 The President and the Vice-President must be from opposite
sides of the river.22' These judges are the Sindics.2 These farmers-judges
(Sindics) have knowledge of the irrigated agriculture and the geography of
the area, which justifies their factual expertise,' but they are laymen when
it comes to the law."' In addition to their expertise, the judges are supposed
to be irrigators of high morals.2" They are neither lawyers, nor officers of the
court."6 Just farmers judging farmers. Many local farmers would otherwise
feel coerced if they had to resort to the ordinary judicial system; which, in
turn, is not knowledgeable about the acequias' ordinances.7
If there is a dispute between two users, the Sindic of the acequia where
the conflict occurs will try to mediate before a case even makes it to the
court."' If an agreement is not achieved, then the Sindic will send the matter
to the court."' If there is a case between the community and one of the
users, the Sindic will decide the amount due by the individual reported by
the warden as having violated the ordinances. If the user refuses to pay, then
the matter will be decided by the court." Hence, as in other specialized
courts, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are built into the pre-trial
phase."
Southeastern Spanish water courts judge mostly cases where the
parties, both plaintiff and defendants, are irrigators or the acequias
themselves.2 If the acequia brings an action against one of its members, the
warden is generally the representative of the acequia's interest in court."'
The warden's role before the court is a hybrid between a prosecutor and an
attorney general." There may also be disputes between two acequias. In
219 VALENCIA WATER TRIBUNAL, supra note 201.
220 TRIBUNAL DE LAS AGUAS DE LA VEGA DE VALENCIA, https://perma-ccY6G9-NW56 (last
visited Apr. 13, 2019); see a/so VALENCIA WATER TRIBUNAL, supra note 201; Victor Fair~n Guill~n,
El Prinepio de la Unidad Jurisdc'ional y el Tibunal de las Aguas de Valencia, 85 REVISTA DE
ADMINiSrRACION PUBLICA 9, 21(1978).
221 VALENCIA WATER TRIBUNAL, supra note 201; see also Fair6n Guill~n, supra note 220, at 21.
222 Fairdn Guildn, supra note 220, at 21.
223 Bonet Navarro, supra note 218, at 61-62.
224 Id at 63-64; see also Fair~n Guilldn, supra note 220, at 21.
225 Fair~n Guill6n, supra note 199, at 1300.
226 Hudson-Richards & Gonzales, supra note 217, at 95.
227 Fair~n Guillkn, supra note 220, at 19.
228 Fairdn Guilldn, supra note 199, at 1315.
229 Id
230 VALENCIA WATER TRIBUNAL, supra note 201.
231 Id.
232 Ricardo Juan Sanchez, La legitimacon en el proceso seguido ante el tribunal de las
aguas, in EL TRIBUNAL DE LAS AGUAS DE VALENCIA. CLAvEs JURIDICAS 271, 281 (Jose Bonet
Navarro & Maria Jose Mascarell Navarro eds., 2014).
233 Id
234 Id at 279. Sometimes other officials from the acequia may bring an action and represent
the acequia before the court. Those officials depend on that acequia's ordinance. Id.
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addition, non-members may be brought before the court, for example, if they
have entered into a contract to use water from the "acequia"25 or somehow
affect the acequia (for example, by dumping used water into the canal).
26
The most common cases are about stealing water during a drought,37 lack of
maintenance of the canals, re-irrigating another farmer's field to destroy his
or her crop,238 and irrigating out of schedule.2"
The court holds trials every Thursday in front of the lateral door of the
Valencia Cathedral.'" Still today, they wear robes and sit in wicker chairs.24'
The proceedings are all oral242 and there is no written account of them. Even
the notification about an upcoming trial is made orally by the warden.2"
The procedural rules are pretty similar to the rules in criminal
procedures in Spain. There is an initial phase where the investigation of the
facts and damages takes place.2' The Sindic of the acequia where the
potential violation occurred is in charge of gathering the evidence.'" He will
visit the site, sometimes accompanied by observers, a sort of experts.
24
Then, there is the trial on the Thursday following the alleged violation.247
The trials are organized by acequia where the case arose and following the
order the acequias take water from the river.248 In the second phase, the trial,
the Sindic from the acequia where the case occurred does not take part in
the deliberations of the case, and the judge presiding the court must be from
one of the acequias on the opposite bank of the river.'" The trial starts with
235 Fairnn Guiln, supra note 199, at 1300. Often, these non-members are corporations. See
Sanchez, supra note 232, at 281.
236 Sanchez, supra note 232, at 282.
237 Jos-Antonio Espin-Sdnchez, Institutional Inerta Persistent Inefficient Institutions in
Spain, 77 J. ECON. HIST. 692, 720 (2017). See generally Javier Donna & Jose-Antonio Espin-
Sanchez, The lliquidity of Water Markets: Efficient Institutions for Water Allocation in
Southeastern Spain (Aug. 16, 2018), https://permaccT5AR-BXPM.
238 VALENCIA WATER TRIBUNAL, supra note 201.
239 Id.
240 Valencia Tourism Found., The Water Court TRAVEL VALENCIA, https://perma.cc/CL2U-
KJRE (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
241 Id
242 UNESCO Decision 4.COM 13.70, supra note 193 (inscribing the Irrigators' tribunals of the
Spanish Mediterranean coast: The Council of Wise Men of the plain of Murcia and the Water
Tribunal of the plain of Valencia on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage
of Humanity).
243 Alicia Armengot Vilaplana, Los Pnlneipios del Procedmiento ante el Tribunal de las
Aguas de Valencia [Procedural Principles Before the Valencian Water Tribunal], in EL TRIBUNAL
DE LAS AGUAS DE VALENCIA. CLAVES JURIDicAs 307, 319 (Jose Bonet Navarro & Maria Jose
Mascarell Navarro eds., 2014).
244 Fair6n Gull6n, supra note 199, at 1301. However, the maximum length of a trial is 21
days. While the infractions happened from Thursday of previous week to Thursday before noon
are to be judged that week, if the irrigator who allegedly violated the ordinances is not there, he
or she has two more opportunities to appear before the tribunal. If they do not appear, the
irrigator will be condemned. See VALENCIA WATER TRIBUNAL, supra note 201.
245 Fair6n Guillkn, supra note 199, at 1301.
246 Id
247 Id. at 1301-02.
248 Id at 1302.
249 Id
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the argument of the warden or the plaintiff.m The warden's testimony is
believed to be true unless the defendant brings enough evidence against it.21
After the plaintiff, the defendant akes the floor and makes his case.2 There
is no cross-examination. Only the members of the tribunal can question.2
Then, the evidence is brought in. It can be documents, witnesses, or expert
witnesses. The latter are often those observers who visited the alleged
violation site soon after the incident occurred, otherwise evidence could be
lost and, if not, in order to protect the evidence, the land may not be worked
on.m In some cases, the tribunal may order a new expert opinion.m If that is
the case, the trial occurs the week after.m It may also be decided that all or
at least two members of the tribunal have to visit the city.u7 The members of
the tribunal then deliberate, in front of the watching public in the Cathedral
square, but in secret as nobody can hear the discussion.m
The tribunal decides whether to acquit or declare the defendant guilty
that same Thursday and the Sindic from its acequia will be the one imposing
the specific sanction according to the acequia's ordinances.9 The tribunal
does not offer any reasoning for its decision. ° The decision is oral and it is
succinctly recorded in the Secretariat.
26'
Normally the Water Tribunal does not specify the sanction. Once the
Tribunal has found one of the water users guilty, the specific sanction is
determined by its acequia.2 2 The sanctions are specified in the different
acequias' ordinances but there is room for discretion.2 The sanctions are
based on what the violator would make in a day in the fieldm or are still
measured in an old medieval currency.2u Still, there have been few cases of
disagreement with the amount decided by the acequia's board. If there was a
disagreement, the Water Tribunal would be tasked to decide on it or
otherwise all the advantages of the quick and fair procedure would be lost








257 Id. at 1304.
258 Id
259 Id They are neither lawyers, nor officers of the court. Just farmers judging farmers.
These farmers would otherwise feel coerced if they had to resort to the ordinary judicial system
which, in turn, is not knowledgeable about the acequias' ordinances.
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261 Id. at 1305.
262 Id at 364.
263 Vicenta Cervello Donderis, La natumleza de las sanciones del Trlbunal de las Aguas, in
EL TRIBUNAL DE LAS AGUAS DE VALENCIA. CLAVES JURIDIcAs 129, 142-45 (Jose Bonet Navarro &
Maria Jose Mascarell Navarro eds., 2014).
264 Bonet Navarro, supra note 218, at 60.
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The authority of the Water Tribunal is never questioned and the
sanctions are complied with voluntarily.2m The fairness and expeditiousness
of the decisions has translated into a great respect of this institution, which
in turn has decreased the amount of enforcement needed26 Very rarely, the
defendant needs to be compelled to comply with the decision. If need be, he
will be compelled by withdrawing his right to use water from the acequia
until he complies.2 6 In addition, the decisions are not appealable. There is no
possibility of review before another judicial court which does not seem to
bother either scholars9 or the water users27 ° given the particular nature of
these consuetudinary courts.
Not only is this a fast and fair judicial process, it is also a cheap one.
The costs that the losing party has to cover are minimal. It has to cover the
expenses for the site visits and the expenses of the notification by the
warden.27" '
The courts are not perceived as biased in favor of the interests of the
acequia or community.2 In fact, its impartiality has never been questioned.
The success of these institutions has prompted the Spanish legislator to
include Irrigation Juries in the internal organization of irrigation
communities in the modem Water Act.Y While it seems that a traditional
institution such as this may have little to teach to the more complex water
systems in the United States, the current systems in Montana and Colorado
seem to actually offer some similarities with these courts. The interaction
between the water courts and the wardens or inspectors is similar to the
interaction between the water commissioners and the water or district
courts in practice. If a water court wants to be adopted or the procedures
made more swift and efficient, reducing the need for a lawyer and choosing
expert judges may be the way to go.
266 Fair~n Guill~n, supra note 199, at 1300. But even the Syndics can be judged. See
VALENCIA WATER TRIBUNAL, supra note 201.
267 Mascarell Navarro, supra note 265, at 369.
268 Fair~n Guilln, supra note 199, at 1306. In order to prevent him from using the water, the
Sindic from his acequia and the warden paint two white lines in the diversion point of the
defendant indicating he is not supposed to be using water. Id.
269 Fairmn Guilldn, supra note 199, at 1306; see also S.T.S., Aug. 11, 2004 (R.J.. No. 193)
(Spain) (relating to the Council of Wise Men, but also applicable to the Valencia Water
Tribunal). See generally Fair6n Guilln, supra note 199; Jose Bonet Navarro, La Jurisdcecion del
Tribunal de las Aguas de Valencia, in EL TRIBUNAL DE LAS AGUAS DE VALENCIA. CLAVES JURIDICAS,
215 (Jose Bonet Navarro & Maria Jose Mascarell Navarro eds., 2014).
270 Id
271 See VALENCIA WATER TRIBUNAL, supra note 201.
272 For an account of the auctoritas (prestige, power of command) of the court, see
Mascarell Navarro, supra note 265, at 369.
273 Consolidated Water Act, art. 84.6 (B.O.E. 2001, 176).
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V. COLORADO WATER COURTS
The Colorado Water Court system was created by the 1969 Water Right
Ace 74 to settle water rights claims based on priority and deal with the
complexities of water rights.25 What Colorado calls their Water Court is a
hybrid between the role that a state engineer or a water agency plays in
other states and courts. As shall be seen, it conflates in a single institution
almost all the functions: adjudication of existing water rights, grant of new
water rights, changes in water rights, and disputes among users. This hybrid
model is not unheard of and could be considered a sort of "one-stop shop."
Sweden's Environmental Courts are in charge of the permit system for
pollution activities.276 In fact, Swedish water courts, which were merged into
the Environmental Courts, were in charge of granting permits.m
There are seven water divisions in the state of Colorado which roughly
correspond to the different basins in the state.2 8 Each water court deals with
"water matters."2m Water matters include "cases of diligence for conditional
water rights, changes of water rights, exchanges, augmentation plans, and
appeals from state or division engineer enforcement orders."m It also allows
the water court to review the rules about water promulgated by the state
engineer.28' If there are issues beyond its jurisdiction but that affect a water
matter, the water court can hear them.28 Any appeal from the water court
goes directly to the Colorado Supreme Court.m However, not all water
issues are delegated to the court. Other enforcement functions relating to
water are located within the executive branch. For example, water
commissioners are in charge of water distribution implementing the water
court decrees.4
Each of the seven divisions has a water judge, a division engineer, a
water clerk, and a water referee.m Water judges for each division are
designated by the Colorado Supreme Court each year prior to January 1r
from the pool of judges from the state district courts within the division.tm
Normally the judge appointed will be reappointed2& m-thus accumulating
274 Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-101
(WEST 2018).
275 Colorado Courts at a Glance, COLO. JuDICIAL BRANCH, https://permacc/Z256-5JWE (last
visited Apr. 13, 2019).
276 Bjinll~s, supra note 30, at 179, 180, 183.
277 13 ch. 13 § Water Act (SFS 1983:291) (Swed.), https://perma.cc/R6P9-3RCB.
278 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-201 (West 2017).
279 GEORGE VRANESH ET AL., VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAW, REVISED EDITION 162 (1999).
29 Id.
281 Id at 164.
282 Id at 165.
283 Id
284 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
285 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-203(2) (West 2017); see also VRANESH ET AL, supra note
279, at 165-68.
286 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-203(2).




experience-but here is no rule establishing this preference. The potential
rotation of the judges assigned to the court should prevent capture by the
special interests. Water judges still have a general docket assigned, but the
water matters must take priority.s Additional water judges may be
appointed if the workload so requires.m
The division engineer is responsible for administering water rights in
his or her respective division.9' A division engineer is the chief Colorado
Division of Water Resources official for each division.29 When an application
for a water right is referred to a water referee, the referee usually consults
with the division engineer.2 After that consultation, the division engineer
submits a "Summary of Consultation" or "Consultation Report" to the water
court with his recommendations!"
A water referee is both an investigator who gathers factsa and a
mediator of sorts-it is his job to serve as an impartial forum to assist the
parties in achieving an outcome that satisfies all sides.' The referee's
position is aimed at reducing the workload of the judge. But the water judge
may decide it is not necessary to appoint a referee and cover the referee's
investigative functions themself.2
7
A water referee is someone who has training and experience sufficient
to qualify them to issue opinions and decisions regarding water rights.2N
Water referees are appointed by the water judge in a division based on a list
of no less than three qualified people.2" The list is given to the water judge
by the executive director of the Colorado Department of Natural
Resources.3 A water judge may appoint as many referees as the division
work load requires.3°' Additionally, the needs of administrative functions are
factored into the appointments.3 The referee does not need to be a lawyerm
however, referees can rule initially on water right applications, changes of
water rights, determinations of abandonment, etc.
A water judge is not required to use a water referee in the resolution of
a water dispute, but applications are typically referred to a water referee.a
Once an application has been referred to a water referee, the referee has the
289 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-203(2).
290 Id § 37-92-203(4), (5).
291 Id. § 37-92-203(2) (West 2017).
292 Non-Attorney's Guide to Colorado Water Courts, COLO. SUPREME CT. WATER CT.
CoMMiTTEE (July 2014), https'/perma.c6UC9Q-QTJH [hereinafter Colorado Guide].
293 Id
294 Id
295 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-203(5).
296 Colorado Guide, supra note 292.
297 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-203(5).
298 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-203(6).
299 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-203(5).
30 Id
301 Id.
302 Id. § 37-92-203(6).
303 VRANESH ET AL., supra note 279 at 167.




authority to investigate, make a ruling on an application, and issue a ruling
for consideration by the water judge. A referee is charged with the duties
of determining the truth of application and opposing statements and
becoming fully advised on the subject matter of those statements!"
Resolving an issue may require the referee to hold status conferences with
the parties via telephone." Given how important actual ground knowledge
is, site visits are also appropriate. If the referee is of the opinion that a
referral cannot be resolved between the parties within an 18-month period,
the referee may re-refer the issue to the water judge.3'0 If a ruling by a referee
is protested, there will be a trial de novo before the water court.1
The costs associated with the services of a water referee, including
salaries, expenses, and other compensation, are paid out of funds
appropriated to the Colorado Supreme Court.3 ' 2 In some cases, mostly those
particularly complex, the water judge may decide to not employ a referee,
but instead a special master, whose cost will be shouldered by the parties.3'3
Sometimes the referee can be appointed as a master if the parties agree. This
appointment could save time and money, but the agreement of the parties is
important because, otherwise, the whole case may need to be heard again by
the water judge.314
While a procedure before a water judge looks very much like any other
procedure before a court in Colorado, the existence of the referee as the
first stop in the process contributes to lower transaction costs and, to an
extent, has procedural and evidentiary rules tailored to the needs of water
cases. For example, the briefs are limited to thirty pages.31 5 In addition, at the
status conference with the referee, the parties may decide to appoint a single
expert instead of using each party its own expert. The latter often leads to a
battle of the experts.1 6 There is even a suggested guide on how to conduct
meetings with the experts to avoid the battle.1 7 It is also a more
collaborative environment than a court proceeding would be. For example,
rule 6 reads: "If the parties are able to reach a resolution of the application,
and the referee finds it to be supported by the facts and the law, the referee
shall work with the parties to fashion an appropriate proposed ruling and
proposed decree for filing with the water judge for approval.
318
While it is hard to find data that allows for comparison between the
water courts in Colorado and generalist courts, there is some dated data on
306 Id § 37-92-303(1).
307 Id § 37-92-302(4).
308 Colorado Guide, supra note 292.
309 Id
310 Id
311 VRANEsH ET AL, supm note 279 at 167.
312 CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-203(6) (West 2017).
313 CoLO. R. CIv. P. 53(a); VRANESH ET AL, supra note 279, at 167.
314 VRANESH ET AL, supra note 279, at 168.
315 CoLO. R. CIv. P. ch. 36 Rule 8.
316 CoLO. R. CIv. P. ch. 36 Rule 6(j).
317 CoLO. R. CIv. P. ch. 36 Rule 11 (committee comment).
318 CoLO. R. Cirv. P. ch. 36 Rule 6(m).
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how the Colorado Water Court compares with an administrative agency.31 9 In
that comparison, it seems that Colorado Water Courts do not fare
particularly well and impose more transaction costs than some alternative
administrative systems ° The issue may well be that judges are not that well
versed in water law and that they need to rely on the division engineer for
technical issues, who would be in-house if a water agency were in charge.
In a Colorado Water Court, from the moment where the application for
a change in water rights is filed to the moment where the decision is
reached, takes an average twenty-nine months, while in New Mexico, where
the proceedings are before the state engineer, it takes 4.3 months.l Colby
also measures the "policy-induced transaction costs" which she defines as
including attorney's fees, engineering and hydrologic studies, court costs,
and fees paid to state agencies, and excluding the price and the costs of
implementation once the transfer has been approved if they are not induced
by state policies." She finds that these costs in Colorado averaged $187,
while in New Mexico, only $54.m In fact, Colorado has expensive filing
fees.n4 Today, the filing fee in Colorado for a change in water right is $447,z5
double the filing fee for an application for a new water right, while in New
Mexico the fee to change one of the defining characteristics of a water right,
such as the point of diversion, is $200.32 However, Colorado's fees are
cheaper than other states such as Montana, which has a filing fee for a
change in water right of $700 to $900 or California where it costs more
than $1,000.32 Hence, the water court unitary system of water rights
administration in Colorado seems to fare relatively well compared to other
states when it comes to transfers on water rights fees, but it seems that
transaction costs in a court system are higher. However, this data does not
illuminate the discussion when the choice is about a general court or a water
court. Colorado Water Courts reduce the functions of a state engineer, more
than the docket of the state courts. There is no data about how it compares
319 See Bonnie G. Colby, Transactions Costs and Efaciency in Western Water Allocation, 50
AM. J. AGRIc. EcON. 1184, 1188 (1990) (showing the high costs of transferring water rights in
Colorado compared to New Mexico and Utah).
320 See id. at 1191 (suggesting Colorado has higher costs because judicial proceedings are
the first stage for water right transfers).
321 Id at 1188. The data mentioned is from the study by Bonnie Colby. See BONNIE G. COLBY
E-T AL, WATER TRANSFERS AND TRANSACOTIONS COSTS: CASE STUDIEs IN COLORADO, NEW MEXICO,
UTAH AND NEVADA (1989).
322 Colby, supra note 319, at 1184.
323 Id at 1188.
324 Bonnie G. Colby et al., Procedural Aspects of State Water Law Transfenr1g WaterRights
in the Western States, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 697, 716 (1989).
325 Filing Fees, Surcharges, and Costs in Colorado State Courts, COLO. JUDICIAL BRANCH,
https://permacc/LZ6Y-Q7UC (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
326 Water Rights Applications Forns N.MI OFF. STATE ENGINEER INTERSTATE STREAM
COMM'N, https://perma.cc/5KVX-EC2L (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
327 Application to Change an Existing Irngation Water Rgh4 MONT. DEP'T NAT. RESOURCES &
CONSERVATION, https://perma.ccP2R6-GYFQ (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
328 Fiscal Year 2016-17 Fee Schedule Sunmary, CAL. WATERBOARDS, httpsJ/perma.cc/3D8S-
LHDY (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
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when reviewing a ruling by the state engineer, which, but for the existence
of water courts, would have been reviewed by a general court. Nonetheless,
some of the features of the Colorado court are fit to inspire other water
courts. Among those, I would highlight the tailored procedural rules, the
figure of the water referee, and the collaborative bent of the first procedural
steps to try to let the parties to agree.
VI. SOUTH AFRICA WATER COURT
Another, more recent example of water courts comes from South
Africa, the country which has recently been in the news as dire restrictions
were imposed in Cape Town as it approached the terrifying scenario of zero
water.m South Africa is also well known for having a constitutional human
right to water."m The Water Tribunal, which substituted the preexisting water
court, was establish by the National Water Act of 1998.3'
While independent and subject to similar rules of the judiciary, 2 the
Water Tribunal is closer to an administrative court as the decisions can be
appealed on matters of law to the High Courts, which function as appellate
courts.m The Water Tribunal's nature has been an a source of confusion and
the Department of the Environment has argued both ways depending on its
interests: at times the tribunal is an administrative body whose decisions can
be reviewed by the courts, at others is a judicial body whose decisions are
not reviewable.4 Some have discussed whether it can solve only cases on
the merits or also cases where procedural issues are challenged.m
This Tribunal hears the appeals of directives and decisions made by
water management agencies, catchment management agencies, or other
responsible authorities on matters covered by the National Water Act, Act 36
of 19 9 8 ." These issues can include denial, suspensions, withdrawal, or
reinstatement of licenses to use water;7 claims for compensation under the
329 Norimitsu Onishi & Somini Sengupta, Dangerously Low on Water, Cape Town Now
Faces "DayZero, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2018), https://permaccZC2W-FKM4.
330 See S. AFR. CONST., First Amendment Act of 1997, ch. 2 § 27(1)(b); see also DD Tewari, A
Detailed Analysis of Evolution of Water Rights in South Ai'ea An Account of Three and a Half
Centuries from 1652 AD to Presen4 35 WATER SA 693, 702 (2009). For a judicial analysis of the
right to water, see Mazibuko v. City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr) (also known as
"the Phiricase"), See also, CB Soyapi, Water Security and the Right to Water in South Afi'ca. an
Overview, POTCHEFsTOOM ELECTRONIc L.J., Jan. 2017, at 1, 6-7, https://perma.cc/2KA4-3APR.
331 National Water Act 36 of 1998 §§ 146-149 (S. Afr.).
332 WATER TRIBUNAL, MANUAL FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTION 14 OF THE PROMOTION OF AccESS
TO INFORMATION AcT, 2000 (Act No. 2 OF 2000) 5 (2005), https-//perma.cc/96ED-ZLH8.
333 The South African Judicial System, S. AFR. JUDIcIARY, https://perma.cc/AA7C-88A8 (last
visited Apr. 29, 2019).
334 Ed Couzens et al., Water Security and Judcial and Administrative Confusion in South
Afiic" The Trustees of the Time Being of the Lucas Scheepers Thist; GAUTENG 2015 ZAGPPHC
211, April 17, 2015, at 10-11.
335 Id at 17.
336 Water& Sanitation, S. AFR DEPT. WATER& SANITATION, https://perma-cc/DS27-DB48 (last
visited Apr. 19, 2019).
337 National Water Act 36 of 1998 §§ 49, 53-54 (S. Afr.), https://perma.cc/WYN5-YGND.
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National Water Act;3  claims against apportionment;3" or the temporary
transfer of water use authorization." It is important to note that the tribunal
cannot review the inaction of the agencies, which judicial bodies can.34
Its nature is well reflected in its composition. The Tribunal has six
members: a chairperson, a deputy chairperson, and three additional
members, plus a registrar.3u The administrative support is provided by the
Environmental Affairs Department, which reinforces the idea of its hybrid
nature.3 " The chairperson is appointed by the Minister of Justice on the
recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission.3" The deputy
chairperson and additional members are appointed by the Minister on the
recommendation of the Water Research Commission.3" The chairperson
must be knowledgeable of the law while the other members must be well
versed in any discipline related to water management.3"  The
interdisciplinarity of its members is important to deal with real water issues.
However, in some instances, the lack of legal expertise seems to have tipped
the balance when a High Court reviews the cases.3"
As other examples reviewed here demonstrate, procedural rules
tailored to the specific subject matter, water management, are often adopted
in specialized courts and enhance the gains on celerity. The Water Tribunal
is governed by its own rules of procedure.34 It shares two procedural rules
with the other water courts already analyzed: parties do not need to be
represented by a lawyer3" and the tribunal may do inspections of the site of
the dispute. ' In addition, the Water Act establishing the tribunal also
338 Id. § 22(8).
339 Id § 19(8).
340 Id § 23(1).
341 See Keri Ellis, A Crltical Assessment of South Africa's Water Tribunal and its Emerging
Jurisprudence, JUCN AcAD. ENvTL L. (July 5,2011), https://perma.cc/KBZ3-G4W8 (click "A
CriticalAssessment ofSouth Africa's Water Tribunal and its Emerging Junrudence").
342 Water & Sanitation, supra note 336.
343 Id.
344 WATER TRIBUNAL, supra note 332.
345 Id.
346 Id
347 Couzens et al., supra note 334, at 10 ("In the Makhanya case an appeal was made to the
High Court to overturn a decision of the Water Tribunal, which had upheld a decision made by
the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry. It appeared that the Water Tribunal had sat with
only one member, who was not legally trained, and that he had decided that one of the factors
which was to be considered outweighed all of the others. The High Court ruled that this factor
had not so outweighed the others, ruled that the decision was palpably wrong, and ruled that, in
the circumstances and relying on PAJA, the appropriate remedy was to substitute its own
decision for that of the Tribunal instead of returning the matter to the Tribunal for
reconsideration.").
348 See generally WATER TRIBUNAL, supra note 332 (outlining specific procedures for
bringing claims under the National Water Act).
349 Water ThbunalRules, DWA.Gov.ZA (Sept. 23, 2005), https-/perma.cc/FD7H-LP55.
350 Id art. 8 (3).
351 Id art. 13.
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envisions mediation as a way to solve disputes.62 The tribunal is seen in
South Africa as a "far cheaper, simpler option" than generalists courts.3
However, as John Thorson pointed out, the South Africa Water Tribunal
also illustrates the need to insulate water courts from administrative and
political forums. 4 The tribunal was put in hiatus in mid-2012 by the
Environmental Affairs Minister and there were "amendments to the Act 'in
the offing.'"t The Environmental Affairs Department apparently wanted to
give the tribunal greater power and make its appointments similar to those
of other courts.m The amendment introduced in 2014 thoughwas aimed at
reducing the tribunal jurisdiction to review water issues related to mining,
leaving those mostly within the jurisdiction of the Minister and making the
Water Tribunal the last resort.57 Nonetheless, the Water Tribunal is still the
arbiter in some of South Africa Water Wars.m Its decisions of reversing a
ruling by the Department of Water Affairs and suspending a water use
license to develop the Makhado mine made national headlines.5
While the amendment did not pass, the Minister stalled appointments
for some time, even though she received parliamentarian questions about
it.3
° Only after a court battle started, did she appoint new members in 2015.3'
The hiatus created backlogr and there are still talks of discontinuing the
tribunal.m Given the water issues faced by South Africa, a stable
administrative structure is needed and the presence of a quasi-judicial body
to cheaply review the decisions of the administration may build trust in the
system among the people. 4
352 National Water Act 36 of 1998, §150.
353 'Couzens et al., supra note 334, at 16 (quoting a media comment made on the case,
Escarpment Environment Protection Group and Langkloof Environmental Committee v.
Department of WaterAffairs).
354 Thorson, supra note 22, at 35-36 (discussing how politics caused the water courts to be
dormant for several years).
355 Makhanya v. Goede Wellington Boerdery2013 (1) All SA 526 (SCA) at 46 para. (S. Mr.).
356 Couzens et al., supra note 334, at 14.
357 Id at 18.
358 See Keith Schneider, As Drought Gips South Africa, A Conflict Over Water and Coal,
YALEENVIRONMENT360 (May 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/5M6W-HQU3 (reporting that "the South
Africa Water Tribunal reversed a January [2016] ruling by the Department of Water Affairs and
suspended COAL South Africa's water use license to develop the Makhado mine").
359 Id
360 Couzens et al., supra note 334, at 18-19.
361 Id
362 S. AFRICAN WATER CAUCUS DEP'T OF WATER AND SANITATION TASK TEAM, REPORT ON THE
STATE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND SANITATION 21, https://perma-cc/DP5F-PEEL
363 Id at 21. But see Couzens et al., supra note 334, at 20 (Some voices internal to the
Department of Environmental Affairs envisioned the expansion of the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal in 2015: "At this briefing it was advised by the 'Deputy Director General', that '[w]ith
regard to the appeal process, [the] Water Tribunal would deal with all appeals in all the other
sectors as well, and not just the water ones'...." (citations omitted)).
364 This point was also made by the court in Escarpment Env't Prot. Gip. v. Dep't of Water
Affairs 6 (Water Tribunal) (unreported) case no. WT 24/11/2009, appeal ruling of 22 July 2011,
https://perma-cc/R7XW-ZJU2; see also Couzens et al., supra note 334, at 10-11 (discussing
opposing arguments that a decision of the Water Tribunal should not be set aside by a court on




Montana Water Courts were created in 1979,36 aimed at adjudicating all
water rights existing before 1973-6 in the Big Sky state.3' Prior to the
introduction of water permits in 1973, the rights were in disarray. At most,
some rights had been adjudicated in district court decrees.' Hence, as such,
the Montana Water Court was not established to perform the roles that we
usually associate with a court. It was established neither to decide conflicts
between two users nor to decide disputes between users and a water agency
like the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC). It is
also an institution that differs from the Colorado Water Courts. As seen,
Colorado has a system where the water courts deal with adjudication, even
though most of it was done a long time ago; administer water rights, for
example approving the changes in those water rights when there is a
transfer; and adjudicate disputes between users.3
The Water Court in Montana deals with the definition, not the
enforcement of property rights.3'0 It can define some of the characteristics of
a right to use water in a prior appropriation state.3' The court always defines
the priority date but it not always defines the volume.7 2 However, the Water
Court is not the only institution that defines property rights. DNRC decisions
can also impact the definition.m Whenever a water right holder applies for a
change, perhaps because they want to sell their water right, the DNRC can
accept or bring new historical evidence and change some of the definitional
characteristics of the water right, weakening the certainty of those water
rights.
374
The enforcement of water rights though, is the power of water
commissioners and generalists courts.m Water commissioners are appoihted
review; and that the court was not entitled to set aside the Tribunal's decision because it was an
administrative decision but not all administrative steps had been followed). The Federation for
a Sustainable Environment also sees the dismantling of water institutions as one of the
challenges to deal with water crisis. Summary of Water Related Challenges in South Afica 2018,
FED'N SUSTAINABLE ENV'T (May 3,2018), https'//permacc/FY2P-YTPU.
365 MONT. LEGISLATIVE ENvTL POLICY OFFICE WATER POLICY INTERIM CoMM., A SHORT HISTORY
OF THE WATER COURT 4 (2015), https://perma.cc/DN2B-6CYN.
366 Id at 1-2, 4.
367 Id at 2-3.
368 Id at 2.
369 See discussion supra Part V.
370 See LAND USE & NAT. RES. CLINIC AT THE UNIV. OF MONT. SCH. OF LAW, WATER RIGHTS IN
MONTANA: How OUR LEGAL SYSTEM WORKS TODAY, How MONTANA COMPARES TO OTHER STATES,
AND IDEAS FOR MONTANA'S FUTURE, A REPORT FOR THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT 6-7 (2014),
https://perma.cc/lX8K-JP8Z (describing how the Montana Water Court implements the Water
Use Act).
371 Id at 5-6, 9.
372 Id at 9-11.
373 See id at 8, 10-11 (describing the Department of Natural Resources & Conservation's
role implementing the Water Use Act, particularly in changing a water right).
374 DEP'T OF NAT'L RES. & CONSERVATION, WATER RIGHTS IN MONTANA 34, 36-37 (Apr. 2014),
https'J/permacc/3BF6-3J7U.
375 Id. at 42.
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in an adjudicated basin if users representing 15% of the rights in a basin
petition a district court.376 Water commissioners deal with the everyday
administration of the water, implementing the water court decrees and the
older district court decrees.37 The commissioners are usually users of the
basins they work at, or someone from the community with knowledge of
water issues and agriculture.3 8 If there are disputes between two users or
between a user and the commissioner, the dispute goes before the district
coure 7 -a district court that likely does not have the expertise, neither from
the legal nor from the technical side, to deal with the water issues raised.
Structurally, the Montana Water Court combines a totally specialized
court with a hybrid model where judges wear two hats, the generalist one
and the water one. The Montana Water Court has a Chief Water Judge and,
since 2011, an Associate Water Judge screened by a Judicial Nomination
Commission where citizens participate.m The judge is appointed by the
Chief Justice of the Montana Supreme Court and confirmed by the Montana
Legislature every four years.3' The selection system combines technocracy,
given the role of the supreme court and the background of some members of
the Judicial Nomination Commission, and indirect democracy, given the
participation of citizens in the Conmussion and the role of the legislature.
Even though there is no requirement that the Chief and Associate Water
Judges need to be experts in water issues, because the only requirement is
that they must have the qualifications to be district court judges, in practice
the lawyers appointed have been professionals with a background in water
law.' Both the selection method and the expertise should translate into
trust and respect for this specialized institution if it were to adjudicate
conflicts. In addition to the Chief and Associate Judges, there are four water
judges, one from each water division.38 The divisions are drawn according to
the drainage basins in the state.m In each water division, a current or retired
district court judge acts as a water judge for the drainage basin where he
sits, similarly to the Colorado model of water courts.!" Those water divisions
were envisioned as chambers closer to the facts; however, the Water Court
rarely uses the water judges,m except on cases where there could be some
376 Id. at 41.
377 Id at 41-42.
378 DEP'T OF NAT'L RES. & CONSERVATION, supra note 374, at 3.
379 Id. at 42.
38o Id. at 6; see Judicial Nomination Commission, MONT. JUDICIAL BRANCH,
https'//permccKMP8-HK9H (last visited Apr. 13, 2019). The Judicial Nomination Commission
is composed of seven members: four lay-members (non-attorney) appointed by the governor,
one district court judge elected by other district court judges, two lawyers appointed by the
Montana Supreme Court who must be from different sides of the state. They serve for a four-
year term and review the candidates to any judicial vacancy in the state. Id.
381 DEP'T OF NAT'L RES. & CONSERVATION, supra note 374, at 6.
382 MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-7-221 (2017); see, e.g., Michael Wright, State's Chief Water Judge
Reappointed BOZEMAN CHRON. (July 14, 2017), https://perm&ccW5VD-35RS.
383 DEP'T OF NAT'L RES. & CONSERVATION, supra note 374, at 6.
384 Id.
385 Id.; COLO. FOUND. FOR WATER EDUC., supra note 165, at 12.
386 DEP'T OF NAT'L RES. & CONSERVATION, supra note 374, at 6.
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conflict of interest.87 The Chief Water Judge assigns the cases to either the
water judges, the associate water judge or the water masters.3 The Court
has preferred to ensure the closeness to the facts by entrusting its collection
to water masters given the lack of water law background of the district court
judges. Montana Water Court water masters are not the equivalent of a
special master in generalist courts, who is a contractor of the court and paid
by the parties; they are instead lawyers employed by the Court with a
background in water law and science.8s
The Water Court is expected to complete the lengthy adjudication by
2028.ss While there is no sunset clause for the Montana Water Court, it could
run out of work.u' Instead of dismantling it, the court could become a
permanent institution. There will not be many capital costs associated with
establishing a permanent court as the court already has a staffed
courthouse. It is a court with only two judges which should be enough to
deal with the water cases that arise.
The Montana Water Court could substitute the district courts in water
cases because it is an institution where the judges are well versed in water
law and have the experience and the in-house resources available to deal
with technical issues. The Montana Water Court could be the enforcement
body that it is not today. Instead the district courts are the ones dealing with
an overloaded docket, which includes water cases even though the judges
lack water expertise. In fact, the district courts often rely on the water
courts for help. For example, in a case fi the Teton River, the district court
borrowed one of the water masters of the Water Court. 2 In that situation,
the water master operated in a similar way to the special masters in civil
courts.13 This data point suggests the need for specialization. It can be
argued that the lack of use of the water judges in the four divisions
somehow weakens the system as it is. If the Water Court would delegate to
those water judges, who are also district court judges, the adjudication of
water rights, then, they will be better positioned to decide on cases about
water rights. While this is true, adjudication of old water rights is a lengthy,
technical, and expensive process and relying on non-experts may not be
ideal. Idaho offers a precedent about converting a court focused on
adjudication into a permanent institution dealing with water conflicts. In
Idaho, the Court that adjudicated the Snake River basin starting in 1987 was
not dissolved once its assigned task was completed. Instead, it took over the
387 Interview with Chief Water Judge Russ McElyea and Associate Water Judge Douglass
Ritter (June 30, 2017) (notes on file with author).
388 DEP'T OF NAT'L RES. & CONSERVATION, supra note 374, at 6.
389 See Donald Duncan MacIntyre, The Adjudication of Montana ' Watei--A Blueprint for
Improving the Judicial Structure, 49 MONT. L. REv. 211, 250 (1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-7-301
(2017).
390 WATER POLICY INTERIM COMM., STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF THE WATER COURT 6,
https://perma.ccAil3M-DJWK
391 MacIntyre, supra note 389, at 235; see also WATER POLICY INTERIM COMM., supra note 390.
392 Interview with Chief Water Judge Russ McElyea and Associate Water Judge Douglass




water adjudications of Northern Idaho and since 2010 it has exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals from the Idaho Department of Water Resources,
which before were decided by district courts.9 4
In fact, the Montana Water Court has recently expanded its functions.
This past legislative session, Senate Bill 28"5 was passed allowing the Water
Court to review some DNRC decisions, in particular the application for new
water rights and change in water rights decisions.m The effects of this
function expansion are still unknown. Hypothetically, it may seem that the
court will likely be biased in favor of the DNRC because it will be always a
party and it would be more sophisticated than individual users. However,
while the DNRC and the Montana Water Court interact during adjudication,
there seems to be some competition between the two institutions which may
counteract he potential bias.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Specialization is not an anomaly anymore in judicial systems around the
world. Judicial specialization can take many forms, from special masters in
general courts that help general judges navigate the maze of a particular area
of the law, to full-fledged specialized courts that are independent of the
general judicial system.
Decision making in water conflicts presents the technical and scientific
factual complexity and convoluted legal doctrines that makes it a good
candidate for judicial specialization. In fact, specialization trends can be
spotted all throughout the western United States, where water is scarce.
Examples abound. District Judge Oliver Wanger decided many of the
California water war cases.97 The Montana Water Court may become a
permanent judicial body.3 8 All over, water special masters abound. For
example, California state courts keep a list of those who could be candidates
to serve as such.2" These examples both confirm the specialization trend and
suggest that there is a need for it. While the particular institutional form
chosen will depend on contextual issues of the particular judicial system, a
pure generalist court may fall short when judging water cases.
Given that the conflict over water is likely to increase in the future, a
planned institutional response may be necessary. While appeals procedures
within water agencies could be a good idea and a quasi-judicial body could
be in charge, water is too prone to political turmoil and the independence of
said body could be contested, as was the case in South Africa, destroying the
benefits it could bring. Focusing on specialization at the judicial level, some
394 Thorson, supra note 22, at 18.
395 SB0028, 65th Legislature, (Mont. 2017), https'//perma-cc/84MX-R2K5.
396 Id
397 See supra note 182-185 and accompanying text.
398 Thorson, supra note 22, at 18.
399 Telephone conversation with Judge Oliver Wanger, former District Judge for the United




changes are more demanding than others, both in terms of setup costs and
in terms of political agreement. A new court system may be expensive,
unpopular, and unnecessary in those jurisdictions where the volume of
water cases is small. But specialization within the judiciary seems to be
occurring informally and should be institutionalized.
Whatever form specialization takes, this Article has reviewed certain
procedural features that could increase the efficiency and fairness of water
cases. Procedurally, the use of experts is the most costly and time-
consuming aspect of adjudication or litigation. Any form of specialization
should make it easier, and more cost-effective, because at least the judge or
a water master will be a more educated consumer of both hydrology and
water doctrines. However, beyond that, procedural rules could be adapted to
the particular intricacies of water cases. One measure stands out: reducing
the risk of a battle of the experts. One way to reduce this risk is having in-
house experts, like the Swedish Land and Environment courts or the
Valencia water courts.
Whiskey is for drinking, and water is for fighting, as Mark Twain
supposedly said.40 While collaborative solutions to water problems exist °
and hopefully will be the norm, fights are likely to get more frequent and
more brutal with the increasing occurrence and growing intensity of
droughts due to climate change.4n Any institutional change that can ensure
that water disputes do not consume too much time and too much money
should be considered. Examples abound. The specialization trend should not
stop.
400 "Whiskey is for Drinking, Water is for Fighting!' U.S. BuREAu RECLAMATION,
https://permacc/PQ4R-ZF7Q (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
401 For examples of collaborative governance in water cases, see Cheryl de Boer et al.,
Collaborative Water Resource Management What makes up a supportive governance system?
26 ENVT'L POL'Y & GOVERNANCE 229, 230 (2016); see also Esther Conrad et al., Diverse
Stakeholders Create Collaborative, Multilevel Basin Governance for Groundwater
sustainabi/ty, 72 CAL AG. 44 (2018); Cameron Holley, Crafting Collaborative Governance: Water
Resources, California s Delta Plan, and Audited Self-Management in New Zealand, 45 Envt'l L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10324 (2015).
402 Bobby Magill, Climate Change Altering Droughts, Impacts Across US, CLIMATE CENT.
(June 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/5KP7-NH98.
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